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The majority of farmers in England currently receive a fixed fee for managing their land under an agri-
environment scheme (Environmental Stewardship), which is based on an estimate of the typical income 
forgone by participating. The aim of this research is to explore alternative mechanisms for allocating 
agri-environment contracts with a view to achieving a more cost-efficient and effective use of funds. The 
focus is on reverse auctions, whereby farmers opt into a bidding process, offering to manage their land 
under prescribed management options at a price that more closely reflects their cost of doing so. The 
researchers have used a combination of laboratory experiments, simulation modelling and farmer 
workshops to consider the opportunity for efficiency gains, aspects of auction design and farmer 
responses to auctions. 
A secondary objective of the work is to explore opportunities for the private sector to engage in agri-
environment actions by leveraging match-funding where there are common goals and mutual benefits 
for private firms and society. This has entailed a review of the payment for ecosystem services (PES) 
literature and consultations with a number of relevant private firms. A particular focus for the latter has 
been the water companies, as they have already established some initiatives on PES around improving 
water quality.  
Reverse Auctions as a mechanism for agri-environment schemes 
A comprehensive review of payment mechanisms for agri-environment schemes was followed by 
detailed research on two auction models and a counterfactual fixed-price model. The options are: 
i. Annual Budget-Constrained Auction: Government seeks to maximise environmental 
improvement given a fixed budget with farmers asked to offer sealed bids to participate. 
Contracts are allocated on the basis of value for money (VFM)2.  Contracts are awarded to those 
offering the highest VFM, paying farmers what they bid, until the budget is exhausted. 
ii. Target-Constrained Auction: Government seeks to achieve a target level of uptake of a 
particular agri-environment activity in a particular region to deliver a landscape-scale impact.  
Farmers offer sealed bids on the basis of individual costs associated with the activity and the 
best VFM bids delivering the target are funded, with farmers being paid what they bid. 
iii. Fixed-Price Mechanisms: Government announces the amount that they will pay for particular 
agri-environment activity and receives offers from farmers prepared to undertake that activity 
at that price. If the scheme is over-subscribed, farmers are accepted into the scheme on the 
basis of VFM, starting with the highest VFM and continuing until the budget is exhausted. 
Broadly, this reflects the design of Countryside Stewardship. 
Performance parameters were specified for evaluating these three mechanisms, namely effectiveness 
(goal achievement), cost-efficiency (environmental quality per pound spent) and social efficiency 
(environmental quality per pound actual cost). Key metrics used in the evaluation for these parameters 
include average VFM and rates of participation in the auction, including how these change over 
successive years of the auction being run. 
The main findings of the experimental research and modelling are: 
1. An auction provides better cost-efficiency than an alternative scheme which offers a fixed 
price set around the centre of the cost distribution. The simulation work suggests that a 
discriminatory price auction (where participants get paid what they bid) out-performs a 
                                                          
2
 Value for money (VFM) is calculated as quality score (as estimated by government) divided by bid cost (as 
submitted by the farmer). 
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uniform-price auction alternative in terms of VFM. This doesn’t take account of the public costs 
of setting up an auction however and is sensitive to assumptions on the distribution of farmer 
costs.   
2. Providing feedback on the VFM of winning bids between successive years of agri-environment 
auctions encourages participation from farmers that are capable of offering good VFM bids. In 
our simulation, feeding back on VFM leads to higher cost efficiency and higher social efficiency.  
3. Publication of guide prices has a modest impact over successive years of auctions but the 
primary benefit is in increased participation in the first year of the scheme. Auction outcomes 
can be manipulated by the publication of guide prices but the impact erodes over successive 
years of auctions as information on the VFM of actual winners is fed back to participants.  
4. For multiple activities, a Pick and Mix auction format (where farmers submit one bid for 
activity A and one bid for activity B and could be successful in none, one or both bids) leads to 
better VFM than an All or Nothing format (where farmers are forced to submit a single bid for 
either activity A, activity B or both activities A and B).  
5. In a landscape-scale target auction, the experimental evidence favours the use of a Follow-Up 
auction format. This maintains sufficient competition to ensure bids are not inflated in the 
initial round while lowering the risks of low participation by holding out the possibility of a 
second round if the target is not initially achieved. The Follow-Up format appears to be robust 
to a number of different target auction settings. 
The workshops highlight some potential challenges in persuading farmers that the auction approach can 
work in their favour but this is at least in part due to their familiarity with the current fixed price menu 
system which is not based on competition for agreements. As such it may be important to ensure the 
new Countryside Stewardship (CS) scheme is embedded before undertaking work on piloting auctions. 
Other than an aversion to change and the perceived complexity of bidding, farmers in the workshops 
offered a number of possible unintended consequences which government should consider in designing 
auctions for an agri-environment scheme, namely: 
 Getting the right prices but the wrong farmers – not all have the same capacity to deliver an 
agreement well; 
 Discounted bidding in order to secure an agreement but a subsequent perverse incentive to 
establish and manage options “on the cheap”; 
 Uncertainty over securing a follow-on agreement may risk lower farmer participation and/or 
loss of prior environmental gains; 
 A price-based system might favour larger landowners and contractors who have economies of 
scale and disadvantage small family farms. 
Despite these reservations, farmers responded well to the auction exercise. Key findings include the 
value of access to information on previous successful bids in helping farmers to set their bid price and 
opportunities to encourage take up of ‘difficult’ options by bundling with other options to enhance 
scores. The findings of the experimental and simulation work are encouraging on these points. 
Piloting reverse auctions for Countryside Stewardship 
On the basis of the scoping work, significant potential benefits of the reverse auction approach have 
been identified in terms of value for money improvements that make the case for further research. 
Piloting auctions at a field scale is necessary in view of the need to test a range of design features that 
could affect the realisation of this benefit in practice and to provide further evidence on cost-efficiency.   
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We propose the following priorities for piloting reverse auctions for Countryside Stewardship funding in 
a Mid-Tier scheme: 
1. A discriminatory price auction (where participants get paid what they bid). Within this the 
following elements should be explored: 
a. provision of feedback 
b. guide prices 
c. Pick and Mix vs. All or Nothing format 
2. A landscape-scale target auction, to include testing the use of a Follow-Up auction format. 
We propose that the sample is drawn from farmers with existing Environmental Stewardship 
agreements insofar as they cannot enter Countryside Stewardship until their current scheme ends, but 
could participate in auction pilots using additional options available under the new scheme.  
We recommend that three groups are captured in the pilots to represent the main farming systems and 
contexts, namely arable farms, lowland livestock farms and upland livestock farms.  Within this 
framework, a range of options can be accommodated, focusing on a limited number of themes, for 
example to represent the key environmental priorities for CS, namely biodiversity and water quality. 
There would need to be some trade-off between the range of options considered and the size of the 
sample in order that the results are statistically robust. 
A number of discrete steps in the establishment and running of pilots are envisaged as follows: 
1. Agree the design options to be tested and target population 
2. Recruit a statistically robust sample with at least 2 groups and at least 150 farmers per group. 
3. Research the sample (cost distribution, transaction costs, capacity to participate etc.) prior to 
running in the pilot 
4. Develop and trial a platform for operating the auction to ensure functionality and utility 
5. Trial the auction design options. It may also be helpful to run the pilot over successive years to 
test learning. 
6. Report the pilots and make recommendations on their use in agri-environment schemes.  
As such we recommend that a phased approach is taken over a period of 2-3 years to provide robust 
evidence on the economic and environmental case for introducing reverse auctions as a delivery 
mechanism for Countryside Stewardship. 
In order to measure the additional VFM from using auctions, it is necessary to compare against the 
standard CS approach (counterfactual). We recommend recruiting a sufficiently large sample to allow 
half to be randomly assigned to a fixed price group and half to an auction group. 
Integrating public and private funding for PES 
From discussions with a range of potential private funding agents, it is evident that they can be broadly 
considered in three groups according to their readiness to engage in Payment for Ecosystems Services 
(PES). The most engaged are the water companies, the ‘PES Ready’ group, with existing initiatives such 
as Upstream Thinking (South West Water) and Catchment Wise (United Utilities). The next group, the 
‘Investors in Ecosystem Services’, are represented broadly by the food supply chain, who routinely work 
with land managers to improve productivity and sustainability but without a formal payment scheme. 
Finally, there is a group of private companies which have a vested interest in funding ecosystem service 
provision e.g. developers offsetting environmental losses associated with construction or insurance 
companies addressing flood risk at a catchment scale. For this study, our analysis has focused on the PES 
Ready group, namely the water companies. 
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A number of public/private models were considered for integrating Countryside Stewardship and water 
company schemes, namely: 
 Co-ordinated but separate public and private schemes: Funds from water companies and 
Countryside Stewardship are channelled into targeted schemes, co-ordinated by catchment 
partnerships or trusted third party brokers. 
 Joint administration of separate public and private schemes (through the public scheme): Water 
companies use the administrative apparatus of Countryside Stewardship and specify additional 
options that they would fund separately from the agri-environment funds.  This model would 
provide a combined interface to farmers and could extend to a common monitoring and evaluation 
framework. 
 Joint public/private purchasing (within the public scheme): Particular options co-funded by water 
companies and Countryside Stewardship under the governance of the latter. This might also include 
elements of joint administration. 
A review of the opportunities for leveraging additional funding from the private sector to augment agri-
environment budgets under PES indicates a good level of interest in involvement but multiple barriers in 
terms of design and implementation.  For the water companies, there is some concern that current 
interventions (Environmental Stewardship options) are not comprehensive enough for addressing water 
quality issues at a local catchment scale. They also have concerns over losing contact and relationships 
with local land managers if their objectives were delivered under a single public scheme. A joint scheme 
would need to demonstrate to the regulator, Ofwat that catchment management schemes can deliver 
water quality improvements at least as cost effectively as engineering solutions.  
For the public agency, EU funding rules require that management options are verifiable and 
controllable; this relates to payment rates, eligibility of the applicant and payment claims.  A key issue is 
the payment rate for a management option, which is required to be no more than the additional costs 
and income foregone on a ‘typical farm’. The lack of flexibility in payment rates and administration of 
public funding may be a real barrier to integration of schemes. 
We conclude that co-ordination of purchasing through separate private and public schemes is the most 
promising model in the medium term as it secures the benefits of joined-up funding and activity without 
losing the flexibility required by the private agent and risking compromising EU funding rules.  
Governance models applied within existing water company initiatives such as Upstream Thinking and 
Catchment Wise provide a useful template. This includes a wide range of representation of public, 
private and third sector stakeholders and should be reciprocal in Countryside Stewardship.  Some 
scoping work is needed to gauge the extent to which synergies can be realised in terms of option 
selection, data collection and scheme evaluation.    
While delivering water quality objectives is tangible and location specific, for other potential PES 
stakeholders, such as the food supply chain, developers or insurance companies, the focus for 
investment is often more transitory e.g. due to the emergence of alternative options or to a change in 
business strategy, ownership, or fortunes.  Nevertheless, these agents should be brought into the PES 
discussions to help scope and develop the possibility for integrated funding in their sectors. We propose 
that this might be through involvement on a PES panel which would observe the research on auction 
pilots and contribute to 2020 RDP design and wider policy.  
  




The following conclusions are drawn from this study: 
1. Laboratory experiments and simulation modelling indicate that a reverse auction approach to 
allocation of agri-environment agreements can provide increased competition and better cost-
efficiency than an alternative scheme which offers a fixed price set around the centre of the cost 
distribution. The cost advantage is most pronounced when there is widespread participation in 
the scheme but was estimated at 15% in our simulation work. In the context of a funding pot of 
£3.1bn over the duration of the RDPE for all agri-environment and forestry schemes, this 
represents a significant potential gain. 
2. In workshops, farmers participated in the auction exercise but were wary of competing for agri-
environment agreements on a price-basis and highlighted a number of potential barriers to 
uptake of a reverse auction approach and design risks. 
3. Pilots for reverse auctions on Countryside Stewardship should test the cost-efficiency of a 
discriminatory price auction (and a landscape-scale target auction) against a fixed price 
approach (counterfactual). To secure statistical robustness, we suggest that the sample should 
be at least 300 farms, randomly assigned to either an auction or a fixed price bidding approach. 
4. The sample for pilots should comprise farmers with existing HLS agreements but offered 
additional CS options. It should be drawn from three discrete landscapes to represent arable 
farms, hill livestock farms and lowland livestock farms, testing relevant CS options for each 
context.  
5. There are opportunities for leveraging increased funding for environmental land management 
through private PES but links to public schemes are currently very ad hoc with multiple barriers 
to bringing these together. Better coordination of private PES schemes with Countryside 
Stewardship would secure the benefits of joined-up funding and activity without losing the 
flexibility required by the private agent and/or the risk of compromising EU funding rules.   
6. Potential private funders should be brought into public PES discussions to help scope and 
develop coordination of funding with Countryside Stewardship. We propose that this might be 
through involvement on a PES panel which would observe the research on auction pilots and 
contribute to post-2020 RDP design and wider policy. Immediate priorities include scoping and 
co-design of a model for public/private PES and developing a common framework for 
governance, operation and evaluation. 
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1 Introduction and objectives  
1.1 Models of agri-environment delivery 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides public funding through the Rural Development 
Programme for England (RDPE) to safeguard and enhance the rural environment through agri-
environment schemes (currently Environmental Stewardship), in addition to socio-economic schemes 
for farmers, foresters and rural communities.  A new environmental land management scheme, 
‘Countryside Stewardship’, will form part of the 2014-2020 RDPE. This will build on the existing 
Environmental Stewardship, Catchment Sensitive Farming and England Woodland Grant Schemes to 
introduce a universal scheme for both farmers and foresters, with a funding pot of £3.1bn over the 
duration of the RDPE for all agri-environment and forestry schemes. 
This project considers two policy issues for the development of agri-environment policy. The first relates 
to opportunities to improve value for money (VFM) in terms of securing better environmental outcomes 
for a fixed budget and the second explores the scope to increase available funding through linking with 
the private sector where there is shared benefit from intervention. Both public and private schemes can 
be considered as models of Payments for Ecosystems (PES) but to date there has been limited progress 
in integrating funding or using novel mechanisms such as environmental auctions. Defra’s Payments for 
Ecosystems (PES) Action Plan, (Defra, 2013), contained the following Government commitments: 
“Explore the potential for different models of agri-environment delivery including reverse auctions and 
match-funding mechanisms, in the context of developing the new Rural Development Plan for England; 
and work with stakeholders to improve targeting and flexibility. Review the barriers and opportunities to 
incorporating private funding alongside Rural Development Programme funding.” 
1.2 Project aims and objectives 
This project is an exercise to: 
a) Investigate the potential for reverse auctions to deliver environmental outcomes through agri-
environment and other RDPE environmental grant schemes; and, 
b) Review the barriers and opportunities to incorporating private combined-funding alongside agri-
environment funding. 
Specific objectives are: 
1. Explore the potential for public-private combined-funding mechanisms and review the barriers 
to and opportunities for incorporating private funding alongside Rural Development Programme 
funding to achieve environmental improvements. Suggest ways of overcoming those barriers. 
2. Assess the policy, practical and legal implications of different reverse auction designs within the 
context of the new Rural Development Programme for England. These should be focused on 
application within agri-environment schemes, including their ability to achieve scheme 
objectives cost-effectively. 
3. Assess the potential for economic experiments to provide further evidence on the impacts of 
different auction designs, including an evaluation of their external validity. Propose a shortlist of 
at least six different auction designs to be investigated further through economic experiments, 
drawing on the environmental auctions literature. Design, run and evaluate experiments after 
consultation with Defra. 
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4. Drawing on Objectives 2 and 3, recommend several reverse auctions for Defra to trial on the 
ground within the new round of agri-environment schemes; and provide initial guidance on how 
these might be carried out and evaluated. Detailed implementation, however, is outside the 
scope of this project. 
1.3 Methods 
A number of discrete approaches were used to undertake this research. These are set out below and 
detailed in the annexes to this report. 
Scope and design of reverse auctions 
This work was led by Professor Brett Day at the University of East Anglia (UEA) and builds on their 
previous work on the design of reverse auctions. The main elements of the work were: 
i. A review of mechanisms for agri-environment schemes to scope and critique available models in 
the context of the architecture of the new agri-environment scheme in England (see annex 1) 
ii. Experimental auctions where groups of UEA students were asked to bid in a stylised version of 
an auction, to test single elements of the auction design. This comprised a total of 222 subjects 
over 14 sessions (see annex 2). 
iii. Simulation modelling to explore a budget-constrained auction scheme using assumptions on the 
impact of farmer decision-making on bidding behaviour and hence on the outcome of an 
auction (see annex 3). 
The various elements of the work are brought together in Chapter 2 to provide an integrated 
assessment of the potential role of auctions in delivering agri-environment schemes and the particular 
findings on auction design which should be taken forward in any piloting work. 
The experimental work was augmented by two farmer workshops – upland livestock and lowland arable 
– to assess practical issues around the use of auctions for allocating agri-environment funding (led by 
ADAS). These explored how farmers respond to the concept of an auction and to test bidding behaviour 
and the effect of some design elements in a practical context (reported in Chapter 3 and annex 4). 
Opportunities for public-private funding of agri-environment schemes 
This part of the project entailed a review of the literature on public and private PES and consultations 
with private firms that might be expected to engage with the PES principle (see annex 5). The work was 
led by Fera and focused on the water sector and a range of other stakeholders.  
1.4 Report structure 
The report is structured around the main work themes, starting with an exploration of the design 
options for reverse auctions that might be used for allocating funding in agri-environment schemes in 
chapter 2.  This covers the scoping, experimental and modeling work undertaken by UEA and is 
supported by the detailed analysis in annexes 1-3. Chapter 3 sets out the key findings on how farmers 
might respond to auctions, based on the two farmer workshops run by ADAS and detailed at annex 4. 
Chapter 4 considers the evidence of engagement with PES from key private sector agents, notably water 
companies, which are detailed at annex 5.  Chapter 5 builds on the scoping work on auction design for 
agri-environment schemes and provides proposals for piloting auctions during the course of the current 
2014-2020 RDPE.    
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2 Reverse Auctions for agri-environment schemes 
This research project’s primary aim is to explore different mechanisms for allocating agri-environment 
contracts and to determine which mechanisms might best contribute to a more cost-efficient use of 
available funds. Efficiency in this context is defined as realising greater environmental improvements per 
pound of expenditure. The focus is not on the sorts of management activities that farmers might be 
asked to adopt under agri-environment schemes, but rather on the economic mechanism by which 
farmers are incentivised to participate in the scheme. In essence, that mechanism helps determine how 
farmers are selected into the scheme and how much each gets paid for the activities that they commit 
to undertake. There are very many possible mechanism designs, each presenting farmers with different 
incentives and each resulting in potentially very different outcomes. This research seeks to scope, 
review and test the most promising options. 
In an extensive review (annex 1), we presented a detailed account of different possible designs of 
mechanism. While a great many possibilities were considered, discussion with the Steering Group 
narrowed the scope to a limited set of options. Those options concern a scheme in which the 
government offers to pay farmers to undertake agri-environment activities. The environmental 
improvement that each farmer might deliver from undertaking those activities is proxied by their 
environmental quality score, a score assigned to them by the government on the basis of environmental 
priority or potential. Since farmers differ in terms of the cost (foregone income) they will incur if they 
undertake the activity, a cost-efficient outcome will tend to direct contracts to low-cost, high-quality 
applicants. Within that general context, the project’s scope is focussed on examining two auction 
mechanisms for allocating contracts and comparing those to a ‘counterfactual’ mechanism based on 
offering a fixed-price. 
2.1 Economic mechanisms 
Annual Budget-Constrained Auction 
The first auction format envisages an auction with a fixed budget. Within that budget the objective is to 
secure contracts delivering as much environmental improvement as possible. The auction asks farmers 
to enter sealed bids with contracts being allocated on the basis of value for money (henceforth, VFM) 
calculated as a quality score divided by bid cost. The government awards contracts to those offering the 
highest VFM paying farmers what they bid up until the point at which the budget is exhausted.  
As a precautionary measure the government fixes a minimum VFM reserve but does not reveal this to 
bidders. Bids that fail to achieve the reserve are not eligible for funding. The government also has the 
option of publicising a guide price which provides an indication of the level of bid that might achieve 
funding through the auction. 
The auction is repeated each year with new entrants (including farmers whose previous agri-
environment contracts have recently expired) ensuring no systematic changes in the characteristics of 
bidders over successive years. After an auction, the government has the option of making public the 
details of the bids and/or qualities of successful bidders.  
Simple applications of this auction format consider a scheme for only one agri-environment activity. 
When the scheme asks farmers to consider undertaking two or more activities, a key design issue 
concerns the format in which the government accepts bids. In an ‘All-or-Nothing’ format, farmers enter 
just one bid which describes the payment they require in order to undertake the set of activities they 
have selected. In contrast, in a ‘Pick-and-Mix’ format farmers enter a separate bid for each activity and 
the government decides which of those offers to accept.  
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Target-Constrained Auction  
In the second auction format, farmers in a particular region are informed that the government is seeking 
to achieve a target level of uptake of a particular agri-environment activity. As in the budget-constrained 
auction, farmers differ in their costs in delivering that activity and are assigned an environmental quality 
score by the government. The government requests bids in the form of sealed bids. The best VFM bids 
delivering the target are funded, with farmers being paid what they bid. 
The auction has a reserve VFM in order to guard against the possibility that farmers may seek to exploit 
the lack of a budget constraint by entering highly inflated bids. The reserve VFM is not revealed to 
farmers. If too few eligible bids are received such that the target is not reached, the auction is deemed 
to have failed and no one receives funding.  
The possibility exists for running the target auction with two bidding periods, with information on bids 
received in the first period being publicised before the second and final bidding period opens. 
Alternatively, following an auction failure the scheme may allow for one additional rerun of the target-
constrained auction in the following year.  
Fixed-Price Mechanisms 
Instead of an auction, agri-environment contracts could be allocated using a fixed price mechanism. In 
that case, the government announces the amount that they will pay and receives offers from farmers 
prepared to undertake the agri-environment activity at that price. If the scheme is over-subscribed then 
the government chooses to fund only those farmers offering the highest VFM up until the point at which 
the budget is exhausted. This is broadly the design of the middle-tier of Countryside Stewardship. 
The central design question for a fixed-price mechanism is where to set the level of the fixed price. If the 
objective is to maximise environmental benefits, then that price would be set at the uniform payment 
that returns the greatest environmental quality for the given budget. Unfortunately, identification of 
this optimal fixed price requires accurate knowledge of bidders’ true costs, knowledge that will not be 
available to the government.  
In reality, it seems more likely that the government will adopt a simpler rule in setting fixed prices. In 
particular, the Steering Group indicated that the alternative fixed price scheme for this project should be 
based on the mean or median of the assumed distribution of costs across farmers. This is broadly how 
payments for agri-environment options are set now. As a result, as a point of comparison with the 
auction outcomes, we examine an alternative scheme offering a fixed price set at the median of the 
distribution of costs. 
2.2 Evaluating Auctions 
There are several ways to evaluate the performance of a funding allocation mechanism. We describe 
those measures here before applying them in assessing the performance of the various auction formats. 
Goal Achievement 
A first criterion concerns whether the auction achieves its basic goal. In the case of a budget-constrained 
auction, the basic goal is to spend the budget. Likewise, in a target-constrained auction the goal is to 
receive enough eligible bids to achieve the target. Importantly, in comparing outcomes across formats, 
it is only valid to compare formats which achieve the same basic goal.  
Cost Efficiency 
From the point of view of the buyer, one useful measure of performance is cost efficiency. In this case, 
that measure is calculated as the environmental quality purchased through the auction divided by the 
money spent. Accordingly, cost efficiency is measured in points per pound. Clearly, formats that deliver 
higher cost efficiency are preferred by the buyer. 




From society’s point of view (as opposed to that of the buyer) the key issue is not how much is spent in 
delivering environmental quality, but the quantity of real costs that are incurred. For society, payments 
to farmers above their costs are simply a transfer of money from one member of society to another; 
nothing is lost to society in making that transfer. In contrast, the cost of foregone agricultural output 
and participation costs represent real losses to society. While the buyer worries about how much money 
they must spend per unit of environmental quality purchased, society worries about how much real cost 
it incurs per unit of environmental quality. We describe this as measuring the social efficiency of the 
auction.  
Like cost efficiency, social efficiency is measured in points per £. The calculation involves dividing the 
environmental quality purchased through the auction by the social costs incurred in that auction, where 
social costs are the sum of normal incomes (opportunity costs) foregone by farmers that are successful 
in the auction plus the sum of participation costs (transaction costs) of all those that bid in the auction. 
Comparison to a Fixed-Price Scheme 
One objective of the project is to assess auction outcomes in comparison to an alternative fixed-price 
scheme. As we have already discussed a key issue in making that comparison will be the level of fixed 
price used in that alternative scheme. In addition, it is important to note that comparisons between 
auctions and fixed-priced alternatives are highly sensitive to the particular distribution of farmers’ 
opportunity costs. As we shall demonstrate, certain distributions of costs will tend to make fixed-price 
schemes look relatively poor in comparison to auctions, other distributions the reverse. 
One other possible point of difference between an auction and a fixed price scheme concerns 
transaction costs: in particular, costs incurred by the government in the administration of the scheme 
and costs incurred by farmers in entering an application in the scheme. In our testing we explore what 
difference it makes to the relative performance of the two schemes when we assume that the costs of 
farmers applying for funding are half as large in the fixed price scheme as they are in an auction. In this 
work we do not examine differences in the costs of administering the two different schemes. 
2.3 Testing Methodology 
The outcomes of agri-environment schemes are undoubtedly dependent on a great many factors; some 
environmental, some economic, some social, and even some that are purely random. Within the context 
of a relatively small scale research project, it is clearly impossible to develop a testing methodology that 
can reflect that incredible complexity. And we make no pretence that that is what we achieve here. 
Rather the purpose of this research project is to provide the foundational evidence upon which further 
decisions to progress with more extensive testing might be made.  
In this chapter we focus primarily on economic factors; that is to say, we explore the performance of 
auctions when the individuals in those auctions are likely to make their decisions based on rational logic. 
Of course, real decisions may not be strictly rational.  All the same, it makes a lot of sense to begin an 
exploration of auctions making the rationality assumption; if an auction fails to deliver any advantages 
under the assumption of rationality it is almost certainly going to perform poorly in the more complex 
context of real-world decision making. Moreover, the testing methodologies available to us to explore 
rational decision-making are relatively inexpensive so that we can examine a number of different 
designs of auction to establish which designs, if any, have favourable properties.  
The testing methodologies we employ in that pursuit are laboratory experiments and simulation 
modelling. As explained in detail subsequently, laboratory experiments mimic the incentives of real agri-
environment auctions by offering groups of subjects’ money rewards for participating in simplified 
 © ADAS 2014                  11  
  
 
simulations of those auctions. Simulation modelling, on the other hand, replaces farmers with 
interacting computer programs to examine how different designs of auctions might play out.  
In the next chapter, we move to a second level of testing in which we ask farmers to consider the pros 
and cons of different auction designs. And in the final chapter we suggest designs for real field pilots of 
auctions. 
2.3.1 Laboratory Experiments 
In a laboratory experiment, groups of subjects are asked to bid in a stylised version of an auction. While 
stylised, the basic incentive properties of the experimental auction are the same as those in a real world 
auction; the amount of money subjects get paid for participating in the experiment depends on whether 
their bid is accepted and the degree to which that bid exceeds their cost. 
Laboratory experiments cannot replicate the diversity and complexity of the real world. Indeed, the 
strength of this testing tool is not in recreating realism, but in simplifying reality in such a way that the 
impact of discrete options for a single element of the design of an auction can be unambiguously 
compared. To be specific, different samples of subjects play out the same basic auction, changing one 
element of auction design at a time. Comparison across samples affords insights as to the impact of 
different options on auction outcomes. A detailed description of the experimental procedures and 
further analysis of the experimental data can be found in annex 2 of this report. 
Experimental Design 
In the experiments, groups of 16 subjects recruited from the University of East Anglia student 
population competed in a series of auctions executed through a computer program. Each subject was 
told that they had farmland that could earn them a certain normal income. Subjects were informed that 
instead of earning their normal income, they could rent out their land in return for a payment that they 
requested in the form of a bid in an auction.  
A number of different auction formats were trialled in the experiments. Indeed, the 16 subjects in each 
experimental session participated in 6 different tasks where each task was an auction of a different 
format. In each auction, bids were evaluated on the basis of VFM. Each farm was allocated a quality 
score and VFM was calculated by dividing that quality score by the rental request a subject made in their 
bid. Subjects (farmers) were not informed of the quality score or normal income of any other farmer. In 
each auction bids offering the best VFM were approved up to the point at which either a budget was 
exhausted or a target number of bids accepted.  
By entering a bid in an auction, subjects incurred a participation cost that they paid whether their bid 
was successful or not. Accordingly, for subjects that felt they had a low chance of success, a reasonable 
strategy was not to bid so as to avoid the participation cost. 
As shown in Table 1, the normal incomes and quality scores for each farm were carefully chosen so as to 
identify four farm types defined by having (1) either a high or low normal income and (2) either a high or 
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 To avoid making this very obvious to participants, both normal income and quality score were made to vary 
slightly around the average Low and High levels.  
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LH Low High High  High 
HH High High Medium Medium-High 
LL Low Low Medium Medium-Low 
HL High Low Low Low 
 
Notice from the fourth column of Table 1 that farms with low normal incomes and high quality scores 
(Type LH) possess high quality-for-cost. Quality-for-cost is calculated as a farm’s quality score divided by 
the cost the farmer incurs in delivering that quality in the agri-environment scheme (their foregone 
income). Clearly, a farmer with high quality-for-cost is capable of offering bids that deliver high VFM and 
hence is likely to be highly competitive in an auction (column 5). In contrast, farms with a high normal 
income and a low quality score (Type HL) possess low quality-for-cost and, as such are likely to be least 
competitive in the auction.  
The HH types and LL types in the experiment were constructed such that they had identical quality-for-
cost. All the same, the high level of environmental quality enjoyed by HH gives them a competitive 
advantage over LL types. In particular, a marginal increase in the bid of a HH type reduces the VRM of 
their bid relatively less than for an LL type. For example, an HH type with quality 100 who bids £100 
would offer a VFM of 1. Likewise an LL type with quality 10 who bids £10 would also offer a VFM of 1. If 
the HH type puts their bid up by £1, their VFM falls to 0.99. In contrast, if the LL type puts their bid up by 
£1 their VFM falls to 0.91.  
2.3.2 Testing Methodology: Simulation Environment 
The simulation environment developed for this project is a sophisticated piece of software that 
attempts to replicate the behaviour of multiple interacting farmers when participating in a mechanism 
allocating agri-environment contracts. The simulator consists of a series of subprograms, each 
representing a unique individual farmer with their own unique farm. Each farmer makes their own 
decisions following logic that can be more or less sophisticated depending on the farmer. Farmer’s 
decisions are guided by their own circumstances but also by what they initially know about the other 
farmers and what they learn about other farmers’ behaviour during the course of the simulation. Faced 
with a particular auction design, the simulator allows us to explore how participation and bidding 
behaviour differs across farmers and how that behaviour evolves as the auction is repeated over 
subsequent years. Indeed, it allows us to compare outcomes for different designs of auction and 
contrast those to a fixed price mechanism for allocating agri-environment contracts. 
In a simulation environment, everything is coded by the analyst. In our case, that means the analyst 
selects the number of farmers, each farmer's costs from participating in an agri-environment scheme 
and the benefits each farmer can offer through their participation. The analyst decides on the reasoning 
each farmer uses in deciding how to bid and also decides how farmers change that reasoning when 
given decision-relevant information. A detailed description of the logic and algorithms of the auction 
simulator is provided in annex 3. Here we provide a brief guide to the key elements of its design and 
logic.  
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Calibration of Costs and Quality 
One of the key issues in constructing the simulation environment is making sensible decisions regarding 
how the opportunity costs of undertaking an agri-environment activity are distributed across farmers. 
On the advice of the Steering Group, we make the assumption that the activities to be undertaken in the 
agri-environment scheme require a farmer to take 1 hectare of land out of production. The Steering 
Group provided us with data from the Farm Business Survey that recorded the distribution of farm gross 
margins (GM) per hectare for 2013. Having adjusted the data to remove the influence of the very high 
returns realised in horticulture, a sample of 1,000 GMs per hectare were drawn at random from the 
resultant distribution. Each of those GMs per hectare was taken to be the foregone income of a farm in 
our simulation. Of course, when participating in an agri-environment scheme, fluctuations in yields and 
market conditions mean that farmers are uncertain as to the actual levels of income they will forego by 
participating in the scheme. Accordingly, we used data published by DEFRA (DEFRA, 2014) to calculate 
the average annual percentage change in GMs across the period 2011 to 2014 and for each farm 
constructed two further possible foregone income quantities that were this percentage higher and 
lower than the foregone income derived from the 2013 data.  
Unfortunately, information on the distribution of quality scores to be used in any future English agri-
environment scheme is not currently available. Accordingly, we simulated quality scores as random 
draws from a probability distribution centred on 100 and with a range of 100. The simulation code 
allows us to allocate those quality scores to farms at random, or in such a way that cost and quality 
show positive or negative correlation. Annex 3 includes an exploration of the effect of different forms of 
cost-quality correlation on the outcome of auctions. 
Risk Aversion  
The basic assumption in the auction simulator is that each farmer knows their own quality score and has 
three possible estimates of what their GM might be in the future. We assume that a farmer uses those 
estimates to calculate their expected foregone income from participating in the agri-environment 
scheme. The greater their level of risk aversion, the more weight they put on low gross margins in 
calculating that expected cost from participation, as the agri-environment scheme offers a guaranteed 
payment. Again in annex 3 we explore the impacts of changing levels of risk aversion on bidding 
behaviour, and justify from the literature and from our own analyses the decision to assume that 
farmers are moderately risk averse in their bidding behaviour. 
Prior Information  
Farmers’ bidding behaviour is shaped by the prior information they hold on the costs and qualities of 
other farms. In the simulator we assume that each farmer has imperfect knowledge of those details only 
for a relatively small subsample of other farms. If a farmer’s prior information is based on an exact 
representative sample of all farmers then it will provide them with an unbiased assessment of the cost 
and quality distribution. Alternatively, and possibly more likely, it may be based on a biased sample that 
we suspect will be made up of other farms that have costs and qualities relatively more like their own.  
In annex 3 we explore the impact of changing the accuracy of prior information. Note that the analyses 
reported in this summary assume that farmers suppose that other farms are more similar to theirs than 
they are in reality. Allowing for such bias reflects our expectation that farmers will know relatively more 
about the costs and qualities of farms in their local region which are likely to be more like their own. 
Such bias tends to reduce bids from farms with high quality-for-cost. For example, consider a low cost, 
high quality farmer who believes that other farms resemble their own more than is the case in reality. 
Under that misapprehension, such a farmer assumes that the bidding environment is highly competitive 
and, therefore, tenders a relatively competitive bid themselves. Accordingly, the simulation results 
suggest that increasing prior bias will lead to lower bids amongst relatively competitive farmers. 
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Bidding Logic  
In deciding how to bid, the simulator assumes that there are progressively more sophisticated levels of 
logic that farmers can use in deciding upon how much to ask for as a payment in the auction. Farmers 
employing the first level of bidding sophistication only consider their own circumstances. They decide 
upon a percentage mark-up that they feel represents a suitable recompense for joining the agri-
environment scheme and enter a bid amounting to their costs plus this mark-up. To arrive at that 
amount in our simulator we randomly allocate each farmer a mark-up on the range 5% to 25%.  
Farmers employing the second level of sophistication go one step further and consider how their 
chances of winning might be affected by other farmers’ bids. In particular, using their assumed level of 
suitable mark-up, a farmer calculates the bids that they anticipate the other farmers in their prior 
information might enter in the auction if those other farmers only used the first level of bidding 
sophistication. Looking at the distribution of those bids and considering the amount of money in the 
scheme budget, a farmer using the second level of sophistication chooses a bid that maximises their 
expected earnings given their level of risk aversion.  
Of course, a farmer might go one step further and employ a third level of bidding sophistication. In this 
case, they would assume that each farmer in their prior information set decided on a bid using the 
second level of bidding sophistication. Reasoning out those other bids, a farmer would again arrive at a 
bid distribution and formulate their own bid as a best response. And so on through increasing rounds of 
sophistication.  
We investigate the impact of different assumptions regarding bidding logic sophistication in annex 3. In 
the results reported here, we assume that different farmers employ different levels of bidding 
sophistication. We randomly assign each farmer to a particular level such that roughly 15% of farmers 
use one level of bidding sophistication, 50% use two or three levels of bidding sophistication and 35% 
use four or more levels of bidding sophistication.  
Response to Information: Guide Prices and Feedback 
Different formats of auction provide farmers with various forms of decision-relevant information. For 
example, some auction formats may provide a guide price. We assume that farmers interpret this guide 
price as the government’s estimate as to the level of the marginal bid; that is to say, the sort of bid that 
will just achieve funding. In the simulator, farmers compare the guide price with their expectation of the 
level of successful bids. If there is a big difference between the two, then a farmer makes adjustments to 
their prior information set to make the farms in it look more like those that would be compatible with 
the stated guide price. We assume that farmers treat prior information and the guide price about 
equally when considering bidding. 
Similarly, after the first year of the auction, the government may provide feedback on the bids, qualities 
or VFMs of successful bids. Again farmers bidding in the subsequent year take note of this information in 
forming their bids. Indeed, we assume that they make adjustments to their prior information set to 
make it look like a distribution of farms that would have resulted in the observed details of winning bids. 
Unlike the guide price, this is real data such that we assume that farmers attach full consideration to this 
information in considering how to bid. When farmers are provided with details of the VFMs of winners 
from the previous auction, they are able to observe the level of the lowest VFM that successfully 
secured funding. In this case, we also assume that farmers suppose that neither they nor any other 
farmer would bother bidding in the next auction if they couldn’t offer that level of VFM. Again we 
explore the implications of that assumption in annex 3. 
In the analyses that follow, we examine how the different forms of feedback (i.e. feedback on bids, 
qualities or VFM) impact on bidding behaviour. For convenience and to simplify comparison across years 
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(and on the advice of the steering group), we assume that the set of farmers participating in each year’s 
auction have identical characteristics to those that participated in the previous year. We also assume 
that farmers in our simulation know that to be the case.  
2.4 Budget-Constrained Auctions 
Our first set of analyses draw on the simulation environment and laboratory experiments in order to 
explore design elements in a budget-constrained auction. For these auctions, the budget in the 
experiments and simulations was set such that around a third of participants would be awarded 
contracts in each of the five years of auctions. Moreover, for the purposes of simplicity and clarity, the 
majority of our analyses consider a scheme looking to contract farmers to undertake a single agri-
environment activity. Only later do we consider the more complex case in which the scheme offers 
farmers the opportunity to undertake one or both of two different activities. 
While the extended reports provide a comprehensive analysis of the research findings, for the purposes 
of this summary we focus on two key elements of the auction design; the provision of information 
feedback and guide prices. 
2.4.1 Information Feedback 
Full Information Feedback 
We begin our discussion by considering how bidding in an auction is impacted by different forms of 
feedback provided to farmers on the successful bids from the previous year’s auction. Our base case is a 
scheme in which the VFMs of winning bids are publicised by the government. Since the quality of bids is 
judged on the basis of VFM, learning the VFM of winning bids is strategically useful information for 
farmers; it allows them to consider how they should adjust their bid to ensure that they offer a VFM that 
has a chance of success. Subsequently, we shall compare that scheme to one in which only restricted 
information is provided either on just the level of payment requested by winning bidders or just on the 
number of quality points offered by winning bidders.  
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of data from the auction simulator. The data describe the 
simulated outcome of 5 consecutive years of auctions in which the VFM of winning bids is publicised 
after each auction.  
To understand Figure 1, note that it plots out information for each farmer, organising those farmers 
from left to right in order of declining quality-for-cost. Remember quality-for-cost is calculated by 
dividing a farmer’s quality score by their foregone income. Farmers to the left of the plot are those with 
the highest quality-for-cost and are those who have the potential to offer the highest VFM bids. Moving 
to the right, the quality-for-cost of each successive farmer declines, such that those farmers are 
progressively less well-positioned to enter high VFM bids. 
In this simulation, foregone income and quality are not correlated such that those capable of offering 
the best VFM will also tend to be those that have the lowest costs. That relationship is shown by the 
black line in Figure 1; costs tend to be lowest for farmers with high quality-for-cost but rise as quality-
for-cost declines4 
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  The cost line in this Figure  is actually a ‘smooth’ (as are all the lines in this and subsequent Figures); that is to 
say, it gives the average foregone income for farmers around each level of quality-for-cost 




Figure 1: Bidding behaviour in a sequence of auctions with VFM feedback between auctions 
The blue lines in Figure 1 illustrate the bidding behaviour of farmers for each of the five years of the 
auction. Recall that the budget in the auction is such that around a third of the 1,000 simulated farmers 
might be awarded an agri-environment contract. Since those with low quality-for-cost have very little 
chance of being successful in the auction, Figure 1 is truncated at the farmer with the 500th lowest 
quality-for-cost. 
Figure 1 shows that bidding behaviour changes with relative competitive advantage. In particular, high 
quality-for-cost farmers enter bids that are significantly higher than their costs but the degree of 
shading in bids (that is, the degree to which a bid exceeds costs) declines for farmers with progressively 
lower quality-for-cost. 
Also observe that patterns of bidding change over successive rounds of the auction. Recall that in this 
simulation farmers’ prior information sets are biased, leading them to believe that other farmers have 
costs and qualities more like their own. Accordingly, before receiving auction feedback, a farmer with 
high quality-for-cost initially believes conditions to be more competitive than they are in reality. The 
revelation of the VFMs of winning bids allows high quality-for-cost farmers to form a better estimate of 
their chances of success in the auction. As such we observe those farmers entering progressively higher 
bids (that offer lower VFM) over successive years of the auction. In Figure 1, therefore, for farmers to 
the left of the plot with high quality-for-cost the blue lines showing levels of bids in each year of the 
auction trend up year on year.  
The opposite pattern is observable for those with relatively lower quality-for-cost. Believing other 
farmers to have quality-for-cost scores somewhat similar to their own, those farmers initially assume 
that they have a reasonable chance of winning. Their bids in the first year’s auction contain an element 
of shading; that is to say, they bid at a level somewhat higher than their costs. Once details of the VFM 
of successful bidders are revealed, farmers with relatively low quality-for-cost revise their assumptions 
regarding their chances of winning downwards. As such, in subsequent years’ auctions we observe these 
farmers entering relatively lower bids, bids that offer higher VFM. From Figure 1 it is clear that for 
farmers towards the right hand side of the plot, bids after the first year’s auction decline to a level that 
is only just above their costs.  
The overall pattern, therefore, is one in which those farmers with the highest quality-for-cost tend to 
increase their bids over successive years of auctions while those with lower quality-for-cost tend to drop 
their bids. The ‘pivot’ point between these two behaviours is somewhere around the farmer with the 
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200th highest quality-for-cost. And, given only about a third of the 1,000 simulated farmers can be 
funded from the budget, after the first year’s auction farmers beyond the 400th highest quality-for-cost 
realise they have little chance of winning and so enter bids that are little different from their costs. Note 
that, so far, we are assuming that there are no transaction costs associated with bidding in the auction, 
so it always makes sense to enter a bid that at least covers costs. 
Numerical details of the auctions illustrated in Figure 1 are recorded in Table 2. The rows of the table 
record outcomes from the auction in each successive year of the scheme. The first column lists the 
number of farmers entering a bid in the auction. Since there are no transaction costs in this simulation, 
it always makes sense to bid such that we see 100% participation in each of the five auctions. The 
second column lists the number of farmers who were successful in the auction and were awarded an 
agri-environment contract. The third column details the total payments made to those successful 
farmers. For these auctions the budget is around £153,500 and in each year this budget is essentially 
fully spent. The fourth column describes the total social costs resulting from the scheme. Since 
transaction costs for participating in the auction are zero, this total is simply the sum of foregone 
incomes of the farmers that are awarded contracts.5 The fifth column lists the total number of quality 
points provided by the farmers that are awarded contracts. Finally, the last two columns provide key 
measures for evaluating auction performance; cost efficiency and social efficiency. As previously 
explained, cost efficiency is calculated by dividing the total quality delivered by the auction by the 
expense the government incurs in purchasing that quality. Social efficiency, on the other hand, is 
calculated by dividing total quality by the real costs incurred by farmers through the scheme.  






















One 100% 334 153,821 131,078 40,372 0.263 0.308 
Two 100% 339 153,554 127,540 39,920 0.260 0.313 
Three 100% 336 153,485 125,216 39,443 0.257 0.315 
Four 100% 334 153,441 123,889 39,149 0.255 0.316 
Five 100% 332 153,227 122,628 38,873 0.254 0.317 
Notes: 
1
 Calculated as total quality divided by total payments; 
2
 Calculated as total quality divided by total social 
costs 
Observe from Table 2 that cost efficiency declines over successive years of the auction, such that the 
auction is 3.5% less cost-efficient in the fifth year than in the first year. That pattern reflects the 
aggregate of behaviours working in opposing directions. On the one hand, cost-efficiency is inflated over 
successive auctions through lower quality-for-cost farmers reducing their bids. On the other, cost-
efficiency is reduced by high quality-for-cost farmers increasing their bids. Overall, the latter effect 
outweighs the former such that overall levels of cost-efficiency decline over successive auctions. 
In contrast social cost efficiency increases over successive years of the auction; the auction in the fifth 
year is 3% more socially efficient than in the first. Feedback on the VFM of successful bids allows famers 
to better judge their relative competitiveness in the auction. As a result, those with high quality-for-cost 
learn to bid so as to successfully out-compete those with relatively lower quality-for-cost. This learning 
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 Note that we also ignore costs incurred by the government in administering the auction. 
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ensures that over successive auctions, awards are concentrated in the hands of those that can deliver 
the most quality at the least foregone income.  
Partial Information Feedback 
Rather than informing farmers of the VFM of previous winners, the government might attempt to 
conceal some of the strategically relevant information by only releasing details of the payments asked 
for in the bids made by successful farmers. The outcome of a series of five years of auctions in which 
only this payment information is released between auctions is provided in the middle panel of Figure 2. 
Figure 1, documenting bidding behaviour in an auction with VFM feedback, is reproduced in the left 
hand panel for the purposes of easy comparison.  
As with providing VFM feedback, releasing payment information is useful to future auction participants 
since it allows them to identify the levels of bid that have previously proved successful. For example, if 
those payments are markedly lower than a farmer had expected, then that farmer can adjust their bid 
down in order to increase their chances of success in a subsequent auction. Of course, without also 
knowing the environmental quality of previous winners, farmers still cannot gauge the level of VFM 
offered by winners in the last auction. Accordingly, they are still relatively poorly informed as to the 
level of payment they should request so as to ensure that their bid has a competitive chance in the 
auction. 
 
Figure 2: Bidding behaviour under different forms of feedback on winning bids 
That lack of certainty is reflected in the rather different patterns of bidding shown in the middle panel of 
Figure 2. While, similar to VFM feedback, farmers with the highest quality-for-cost tend to increase their 
bids over successive years of auctions, payment feedback does not induce lower quality-for-cost farmers 
to drop their bids. Instead, these farmers’ bids, encouraged by the appearance of some relatively high 
payments amongst the previous auction’s successful bids, tend to edge up over successive auctions. As 
shown in the middle columns of Table 3, that different pattern of bidding means that cost-efficiency 
declines more rapidly and further over successive rounds of an auction with payment feedback than it 
does in an auction with VFM feedback. 
The rightmost panel of Figure 2 illustrates bidding behaviour when feedback is limited to revealing just 
the environmental quality scores of winners of previous auctions. In addition to knowing the quality 
scores of winners, farmers provided with this information can work out approximately how much each 
got paid by dividing the auction budget by the number of winners. To that extent, feedback on quality 
scores provides auction participants with somewhat more information than feedback just on payments. 
All the same, from Figure 2 and Table 3, we observe that bidding patterns across successive auctions 
with quality feedback is very similar to that with payment feedback and that both perform less well in 
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terms of cost-efficiency and social-efficiency than an auction with VFM feedback, particularly in later 
years’ auctions.  
























One 100% 0.263 0.308 
 
100% 0.263 0.308 
 
100% 0.263 0.308 
Two 100% 0.260 0.313 
 
100% 0.259 0.307 
 
100% 0.259 0.312 
Three 100% 0.257 0.315 
 
100% 0.255 0.307 
 
100% 0.255 0.312 
Four 100% 0.255 0.316 
 
100% 0.253 0.307 
 
100% 0.251 0.313 
Five 100% 0.254 0.317 
 
100% 0.249 0.304 
 
100% 0.249 0.313 
Notes: 
1
 Participation rate in percent; 
2
 Cost efficiency calculated as quality points per £ of govt. expenditure on 
contracts; 
3
 Social efficiency calculated as quality points per £ of farmer costs through taking on a contract 
Our interim conclusion, therefore, is that the simulation evidence favours VFM feedback over auction 
formats that restrict feedback to just the payment or quality of winning bids.  We proceed by 
investigating whether that conclusion continues to hold as more realism is introduced to the simulation. 
Transaction Costs 
Thus far we have assumed that farmers’ only cost in winning a contract is the income they forego 
through undertaking the agri-environment activity. In reality, of course, farmers may incur costs just 
through the action of applying for funding through the scheme. There is some evidence that such costs 
are not insubstantial, for example, Mettepenningen et al. (2009) estimate transaction costs of this 
nature to be around £20 per ha for farms participating in European agri-environment schemes. 
Importantly, the existence of such transaction costs may deter farmers from even applying for funding 
through the scheme. 
Figure 3 illustrates the bidding behaviour of those that choose to participate in the auction at three 
different levels of transaction cost, with the medium cost being our best estimate of £20. Note that all 
three of these simulated auctions provide VFM feedback on previous winners. 
The first thing to note from Figure 3 is that the existence of transaction costs shifts bids upwards 
compared to Figure 2; farmers seek to cover not only their foregone income from lost agricultural 
output but also the transaction cost of participating in the scheme. Accordingly bids with a £50 
transaction cost tend to be higher than those with a £20 transaction cost which in turn tend to be bigger 
than those with a £5 transaction cost. Besides that, the pattern of bidding across successive auctions 
looks somewhat similar to what we saw before; bids, particularly those from high quality-for-cost 
farmers, tend to increase over auctions as feedback allows them to discover about their relative 
competitive advantage. 
 




Figure 3: Bidding behaviour under different assumptions regarding transaction costs 
Table 4 summarises the outcome of the auctions graphed in Figure 3. Given the pattern of increasing 
bids seen in the graphs, we might expect a steady decline in the cost efficiency of the auction. In fact, at 
all three levels of transaction cost we observe something somewhat different: between the first auction 
and the second, cost efficiency steps up before declining over subsequent auctions. The initial jump in 
cost efficiency is mirrored by a similar increase in social efficiency. And in all three cases we then 
observe social efficiency tending to increase over the subsequent years’ auctions. 
Table 4: Auction outcomes under different assumptions regarding transaction costs 























One 47.0% 0.248 0.298 
 
40.1% 0.235 0.278 
 
35.3% 0.216 0.246 
Two 48.1% 0.250 0.310 
 
44.5% 0.243 0.297 
 
40.2% 0.232 0.272 
Three 42.7% 0.249 0.311 
 
40.5% 0.242 0.297 
 
36.2% 0.226 0.267 
Four 43.6% 0.247 0.313 
 
42.0% 0.240 0.299 
 
38.6% 0.229 0.273 
Five 42.7% 0.246 0.314 
 
41.0% 0.240 0.300 
 
37.5% 0.227 0.272 
Notes: 
1
 Participation rate in percent; 
2
 Cost efficiency calculated as quality points per £ of govt. expenditure on 
contracts; 
3
 Social efficiency calculated as quality points per £ of farmer costs through taking on a contract 
To understand the seeming inconsistency between the graphs and the table data, observe Figure 4. This 
figure plots out the proportion of farmers at each point on the quality-for-cost distribution that choose 
to participate in the auction.  
Concentrate first on the data recording participation in the first year’s auction given by the dark blue 
line. Not surprisingly, all high quality-for-cost farmers enter bids. In contrast, an increasing proportion of 
farmers with progressively lower quality-for-cost choose not to bid in the scheme: the lower a farmer’s 
quality-for-cost the less competitive they are in the auction and the more chance their bid will be 
rejected. Of course, with a transaction cost, having a bid rejected leaves a farmer worse off than if they 
had not entered a bid at all. Accordingly, the fact that the lines on the graph fall from left to right 
reflects the fact that a farmer’s bid is more likely to fail and therefore they are more likely not to 
participate in the first place. 
 




Figure 4: Proportion of farmers participating in the auction under different assumptions regarding transaction costs 
Also apparent in Figure 4 is the fact that, for any particular level of quality-for-cost, as transaction costs 
increase, participation in the first year’s auction falls. Again, the higher the transaction costs the larger 
the risks of failure and the more likely it is that farmers will not participate in the auction. 
Now consider how rates of participation change as we progress through successive years of the auction. 
Observe that for all three levels of transaction cost participation rates amongst those with high quality-
for-cost increase markedly after the first year, while those with relatively low quality-for-cost tend to 
fall. The ‘pivot’ point in all cases is around the 333rd highest quality-for-cost farmer. Clearly that pattern 
of changing participation over sucessive auctions reflects the provision of information feedback.  
All farmers begin with a biased prior-information set, but for high quality-for-cost farmers that 
information leads them to believe that the bidding environment is more competitive than is actually the 
case. Faced with unrecoverable transaction costs, many farmers that could potentially offer attractive 
bids, simply choose not to bid. Likewise, some farmers with low quality-for-cost, believing things to be 
less competitive than they really are, make the opposite decision and enter a bid.  
Once feedback on the VFM of successful bids is revealed after the first year’s auction, some high quality-
for-cost farmers that previously may have chosen not to participate are encouraged to enter a bid. 
Accordingly, after the first year we observe increasing numbers of high quality-for-cost farmers offering 
reasonable VFM bids. While the payment being asked for by farmers at a certain cost level may be 
increasing from year to year - explaining the bidding pattern in Figure 4 - the number of good VFM bids 
is also increasing as more farmers with high quality-for-cost participate in the auction - explaining the 
increased levels of cost-efficiency in the second year’s auction that is documented in Table 4. In 
addition, once information from the first year’s auction is released some low quality-for-cost farmers 
realise it is not actually worth their while bidding. The combination of high quality-for-cost farmers 
entering the auction and low quality-for-cost farmers choosing not to enter bids that incur them 
pointless transaction costs, leads to the progressive improvements in social efficiency.  
The interaction of transaction costs and information feedback is one of the most important insights 
generated by the simulation analyses. It appears that feedback can be a very important factor in 
improving both the cost efficiency and the social efficiency of a repeated auction scheme. 
Experimental Analyses 
We turn now to consider complementary evidence from laboratory experiments designed to explore 
differences in bidding behaviour under different formats of information feedback between auctions. 
Table 5 records outcomes from a series of such experimental auctions. In those auctions subjects faced 
a transaction cost from bidding that was set at a magnitude comparable to that in the simulation. The 
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left hand columns summarise auctions where subjects were provided with VFM feedback on winning 
bids while the right hand columns summarise auctions where only limited feedback was provided. 
Table 5: Performance Measures for Budget-Constrained Auction with Full Information and Restricted 
Information Feedback 

















One 9.00 84.2% 14.46 16.37  9.73 84.3% 14.03 16.10 
Two 12.35 74.2% 14.34 16.22  11.00 81.9% 13.94 16.16 
Three 13.04 64.7% 14.37 16.80  11.56 74.4% 13.84 16.23 
Four 12.44 54.2% 14.27 16.84  11.64 71.7% 13.64 16.31 
Five 12.83 52.6% 14.23 16.78  11.64 65.7% 13.60 16.16 
Average 11.93 66.0% 14.34 16.60  11.11 75.6% 13.81 16.19 
Notes: 
1 
VFM of the lowest VFM bid accepted for funding; 
2
 Percentage of farmers entering a bid; 
3
 Cost efficiency 
calculated as quality points per £ spent in the auction;
 4
 Social efficiency calculated as quality points per £ spent by 
farmers in foregone income and transaction costs 
The rows of Table 5 record outcomes from the five years of successive auctions with averages displayed 
in the row labelled ‘Overall’. Four different measures are recorded for each auction. The first column 
documents the marginal VFM; that is to say, the VFM offered by the worst bid accepted for funding. The 
second column details the proportion of subjects choosing to enter a bid in the auction. The third 
column provides our core measure of performance of the auction, cost efficiency. Finally the last column 
records social efficiency; that is to say, the real costs incurred per unit of environmental quality 
achieved.  
Concentrate first on the left hand columns of Table 5 which report data from full information feedback 
treatments. The first pattern to note from Table 5 is that participation starts reasonably high with 84% 
of subjects entering bids in the first year but falls over successive rounds of the auction. 
At first glance, that pattern of declining participation looks somewhat different to that which was 
observed in the simulation data. Accordingly, Figure 5 provides a summary plot of the experimental data 
providing a more detailed picture of the patterns of bidding behaviour. 
Figure 5 conveys a lot of information. It plots the average bid by farms of each type for each year. 
Moreover the size of the points represents the proportion of bidders of that type entering a bid. Recall 
that farms of each type hold very similar costs and quality scores and that there are equal numbers of 
farms of each type in each auction. The grey ribbon depicts the range of VFMs accepted for funding 
through each year of the auction such that its bottom boundary traces out the path of the marginal 
VFM. The dark line depicts the path of the average bid. 
 




Figure 5: Bidding patterns in experimental auctions with full and limited information feedback 
Concentrate first on the left hand panel of Figure 5 which depicts the same data on auctions with full 
information feedback as recorded in the left hand columns of Table 5. Notice that the size of the solid 
squares remains large across each auction, indicating on-going high participation amongst the most 
competitive (LH) farm type; a pattern identical to that seen in the simulations. In contrast, while 
participation remains strong amongst the moderately competitive (HH) farm type, with the 
experimental data we do not see the same significant increase in participation over successive years as 
was evident in the simulation data. We attribute that to differences in the cost distribution and 
competitive pressures in the experiments where in most circumstances only half of the moderately 
competitive group might expect to be funded.  
Also notice that participation in the first year is high amongst the least competitive farm types (LL and 
HL) since subjects have very little idea as to whether they are able to offer competitive bids. But the 
optimistic participation seen in the first year soon dwindles as subjects learn from their own experience 
along with the feedback provided on winning bids that they are unlikely to win a contract through the 
auction. As can be seen in Table 5, the fact that uncompetitive subjects drop out as the auction 
progresses contributes to a general increase in social efficiency as those subjects avoid the unnecessary 
expense incurred through paying the participation cost. 
The lack of increasing participation amongst farms in the competitive fringe explains why the 
experimental data in Table 5 shows declining cost from the first to the second year in contrast to the 
reverse observed in the simulation (Table 6).  
On the other hand, closer analysis of Figure 5 confirms many of the conclusions we drew from the 
simulation data regarding patterns of bidding. Observe that over successive auctions the average VFM 
of highly competitive (LH) farm types progressively falls. We assume that feedback on the VFMs of 
winning bids reveals to this group that they have a competitive advantage and so encourages them to 
enter higher bids.  
In contrast, we observe a marked increase in the average VFM offered by the moderately competitive 
(HH) farm types. Full information feedback provides clear signals to this group as to the VFM of the 
marginal bid, increasing competition between subjects at that margin and forcing that competitive 
fringe to enter progressively better VFM bids. In Table 5 that effect is witnessed by the rising marginal 
VFM over progressive year’s auctions. 
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Accordingly, our analysis identifies four key effects on bidding behaviour generated by providing 
feedback between years of the auction; 
1. Information alerts high quality-for-cost, competitive types to the possibility of shading up 
their bids, an effect which progressively pushes down cost efficiency. 
2. Information generates clear signals as to the VFM of the marginal bid increasing pressures 
between those at the competitive fringe to reduce bids, an effect that progressively pushes 
up cost efficiency 
3. Information encourages participation amongst competitive types who subsequently enter the 
auction offering good VFM bids, an effect which enhances cost efficiency 
4. Information discourages participation amongst low quality-for-cost, uncompetitive types who 
then choose not to participate in the auction, an effect which increases the social efficiency of 
the auction. 
Finally, consider the data in the right hand columns of Table 5 and its detailed depiction in the right 
hand panel of Figure 5. That data concerns a series of experimental auctions in which only limited 
information is fed back between years of the auction. The first key difference to note is higher levels of 
on-going participation in the auction, particularly amongst non-competitive farm types. When 
information is limited, uncompetitive farmers take longer to establish that they have little chance of 
bidding successfully in the auction. Limiting information feedback tends to reduce social efficiency. 
Also evident in the data is the large cost efficiency advantage enjoyed by the full information treatment 
over treatments that somehow limit the feedback of information to farmers. A clue as to where that 
advantage arises can be found in comparing the data on the VFM offered by the marginal bidder. 
Despite starting off lower in limited feedback treatments, the marginal VFM rises more quickly and to a 
higher level in auctions where subjects receive full information feedback.  
The data suggest that full information feedback provides bidders in the competitive fringe with exact 
details as to the level of VFM they have to target in order to have any chance of success in the auction. 
Competition amongst this group is enhanced by that information and results in a significant reduction in 
the level of bids posted in the auction.  
Conclusion 
In terms of recommendations concerning the design of a budget-constrained auction, the simulation 
and experimental evidence points towards the fact that information increases competition and 
improves cost efficiency of the auction. Our analyses provide little support for forms of feedback that 
limit farmers’ strategic opportunities for bid-shading. 
2.4.2 Guide Price 
One way the government might influence bidding in an auction is by suggesting a guide price. A guide 
price is an amount that the auctioneer, in this case the government, quotes in advance of the auction as 
being the level of bid that they expect will be successful. 
Suggesting a low guide price might encourage competitive bidding while publicising a generous guide 
price might encourage participation. We saw, for example, that in the first year’s auction before farmers 
receive any feedback, some high quality-for-cost farmers are deterred from bidding because of the 
existence of transaction costs. Providing such individuals with a signal that they are competitive could 
potentially enhance the efficiency of the auction.  
To explore the impact of guide prices, we simulated an auction with £20 transaction costs and VFM 
feedback and a variety of guide prices spanning the level of the marginal bid seen in previous 
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simulations; those consisted of a low guide price at £400, a medium guide price at £600 and a high guide 
price at £800. Comparison of bidding behaviour in those three simulated auction schemes is shown in 
Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Bidding behaviour under different guide prices 
The introduction of guide prices has a number of interacting effects. As one might expect, Figure 6 
shows that in the initial run of the auction (the dark blue line) relatively low guide prices tend to pull 
down bids while relatively high guide prices encourage higher bids. That bidding pattern would suggest 
that in the first year’s auction we might expect to see lower cost-efficiency as the guide price increases. 
At the same time, the participation data in Figure 7 shows a counteracting force: as the guide price 
increases more and more relatively competitive farmers are encouraged to bid in the first year’s 
auction.  
 
Figure 7: Participation under different guide prices 
The data in Table 6 provides insights as to how those two counteracting effects play out in the 
aggregate. With the low guide price (£400), the fact that bids are relatively competitive is swamped by 
the lack of participation of competitive bidders; cost-efficiency in the first year is only 0.219 pts/£. With 
the medium guide price (£600), increased rates of participation from competitive bidders offsets 
generally higher payment requests leading to a cost efficiency in the first year of 0.238 pts/£. Increasing, 
the guide price to £800, greatly increases participation, but that gain is counterbalanced by less 
competitive bidding such that cost efficiency in the first year remains at 0.238 pts/£. Referring back to 
Table 4, it is apparent that providing a medium or high guide price offers some minor gains in the first 
year over a scheme with no guide prices where cost efficiency is 0.235 pts/£. 
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Table 6: Simulated auction outcomes under different guide prices 























One 34.8% 0.219 0.255 
 
45.3% 0.238 0.289 
 
56.7% 0.238 0.289 
Two 40.2% 0.238 0.287 
 
43.8% 0.240 0.299 
 
40.9% 0.238 0.302 
Three 41.2% 0.238 0.295 
 
39.1% 0.239 0.296 
 
39.5% 0.237 0.301 
Four 41.8% 0.239 0.298 
 
43.1% 0.239 0.300 
 
41.7% 0.236 0.302 
Five 40.9% 0.239 0.300 
 
41.1% 0.238 0.302 
 
41.1% 0.237 0.303 
Notes: 
1
 Participation rate in percent; 
2
 Cost efficiency calculated as quality points per £ of govt. expenditure on 
contracts; 
3
 Social efficiency calculated as quality points per £ of farmer costs through taking on a contract 
Unsurprisingly, feedback on actual winning bids erodes the guide price effect. Over successive auctions 
bids escalate in the low guide price auction but tend to fall in the high guide price auction. In contrast, 
participation rates increase in the low guide price auction, but fall in the high guide price auction. 
Indeed, the data in Table 6 suggests that over successive years, bidding patterns tend to converge. 
Conspicuously, cost-efficiency in the second and subsequent year’s auctions is somewhat lower than in 
the auction with no guide price (see Table 4). It appears that the advantages that an appropriately 
positioned guide price may offer by way of encouraging participation in the first year may be eroded 
in subsequent years as a result of encouraging less competitive bidding. 
Experimental Analyses 
Experiments were also carried out to explore the impact of guide prices on bidding behaviour. 
Treatments were run with two different guide prices. The low guide price was set halfway between the 
costs of the low-cost and high-cost farm types, sending a signal to the high cost types that they were 
unlikely to be successful in the auction. The high guide price was set at a level above the cost of the high 
cost farm types, sending a signal to every farmer that they might be successful. Bidding behaviour in 
those auctions is contrasted with an auction with no guide price in Figure 8 and summary details of 
those auctions transcribed in Table 7. 
 
Figure 8: Bidding patterns in experimental auctions with different guide prices 
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Table 7: Experimental auction outcomes under different guide prices 























One 84.4% 12.57 15.13 
 
79.7% 9.00 14.56 
 
88.7% 11.20 13.72 
Two 71.9% 13.04 14.65 
 
73.4% 12.95 14.68 
 
77.4% 12.35 13.68 
Three 64.1% 13.52 14.53 
 
60.9% 13.38 14.63 
 
69.4% 13.04 13.95 
Four 54.7% 12.80 14.52 
 
48.4% 12.44 14.35 
 
59.7% 13.26 13.95 
Five 60.9% 13.38 14.41 
 
46.9% 12.83 14.12 
 
50.0% 13.33 14.14 
Notes: 
1
 Proportion of farmers entering a bid; 
2
 VFM of the lowest VFM bid accepted for funding; 
4
 Cost efficiency 
calculated as quality points per £ spent in the auction 
As with the simulation data, the high guide price encourages participation in the first year’s auction. 
Some 89% of those seeing the high guide price register a bid compared to only 80% of those seeing the 
low guide price. Once again, however, due to the nature of the cost distribution in the experiment that 
participation effect is most pronounced for the non-competitive (HL) farm types and not for farmers in 
the competitive fringe. Accordingly, the participation effect does little to enhance cost efficiency in the 
high guide price treatment. Rather, we observe that the high guide price leads to significantly inflated 
bids in the first year; notice in Figure 8 the difference in the average VFM bid by highly competitive (LH) 
farm types in the first year. As a result, and as detailed in Table 7, the high guide price treatment returns 
significantly lower cost efficiency in the first year. 
Over subsequent years’ auctions, bidding patterns tend to converge. Noticeably in Table 7 we witness 
increasingly high VFM bids from the highly competitive (LH) farm types in contrast to declining VFM bids 
from the same farm types in the low guide price auction.  
Conclusion 
Our analysis demonstrates that guide prices have the ability to shape bidding behaviour particularly in 
the first year’s auction before farmers begin to receive feedback on real bids. The impact of guide prices 
consists of two opposing effects: a high (low) guide price tends to encourage (discourage) participation 
while inflating (deflating) bids from those that participate. While the relative size of those effects will be 
dependent on the particular circumstances of the auction, it appears that the best strategy for setting a 
guide price is to fix it around a truthful estimate of the likely marginal bid. Such a guide price will 
encourage participation from those farmers who are on the competitive fringe while discouraging 
participation from non-competitive farmers. Likewise, a guide price set at that level will give relatively 
little encouragement to highly competitive farmers to shade up their bids. 
In both the simulation and experimental work, we find little evidence to support the idea that guide 
prices can be used to improve the cost efficiency of the auction. While some small gains may be made 
in the first year, those are offset by changes in cost efficiency in subsequent year’s auctions. Perhaps the 
single most convincing argument for a guide price is that, by reducing the perceived risk of bidding, it 
can be used to encourage participation in the first year’s auction, a factor that may be important in 
enhancing engagement in a real world application.  
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2.4.3 Comparison to Fixed Price Alternatives 
A central objective of the simulation environment is to provide a means of comparing auction outcomes 
with those of alternative fixed-price allocation mechanisms. Figure 9 provides a graphical representation 
of such a comparison for a scheme where farmers incur £20 transaction costs.  
 
Figure 9: Comparison of pricing and quantity outcomes for schemes using different allocation mechanisms when 
transaction costs are £20 
The left-hand panel records the auction outcome in the fifth year where the vertical line represents the 
number of farmers funded through that auction, in this case 318. Approximately speaking the budget 
can be visualised as the area under the bid curve up to that vertical line. The right-hand panel shows the 
outcome for a fixed price alternative scheme in which the government fixes the price at what it believes 
to be the median cost of farmers. In this case the price is £622.48 and a total of 247 contracts are 
awarded each receiving that price as a payment. Again, the budget can be visualised as the area below 
the price line up to the vertical line at 247 farmers. 
The clear message is that the auction mechanism outperforms this fixed-price alternative scheme. 
Notice, that the bids received in the auction are lower than the price that farmers would have received 
under the median fixed price scheme. The savings the government makes through the auction, 
therefore, allows for more farmers to be funded through the scheme budget. Indeed in the simulation, 
71 more farmers or roughly 30% more contracts are awarded. Overall, therefore, the auction proves to 
be significantly more cost-efficient than the median fixed price scheme. In the 5th year of the scheme the 
auction is approximately 15% more efficient returning 0.240 units of environmental quality for every 
pound spent as compared to 0.205 pts/£ through the median price scheme.  
The specific outcomes of the two schemes over all 5 years of simulations are compared in Table 8. 
Notice that as with the auction, farmer bidding behaviour in the median price scheme changes from 
year to year. In the first year, participation in that scheme is 53.1% but this creeps up to 57.7% as 
feedback on the VFM of winning bids is revealed after successive auctions. Some minor gains in cost 
efficiency are precipitated as the auctions progress, but the fixed price scheme never manages to 
achieve the levels of cost efficiency observed in the auction. 
  
Bid Curve or 
Price Line 
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Table 8: Auction outcomes compared to those from alternative fixed price schemes  





Median Fixed Price  
(full transaction costs)  
Median Fixed Price 
(half transaction costs) 













One 40.1% 0.235 0.278 
 
53.1% 0.204 0.267 
 
58.0% 0.205 0.282 
Two 44.5% 0.243 0.297 
 
54.6% 0.205 0.270 
 
58.5% 0.205 0.281 
Three 40.5% 0.242 0.297 
 
56.1% 0.205 0.271 
 
59.2% 0.205 0.283 
Four 42.0% 0.240 0.299 
 
56.9% 0.205 0.272 
 
60.2% 0.206 0.286 
Five 41.0% 0.240 0.300 
 
57.7% 0.205 0.272 
 
60.4% 0.206 0.286 
Notes: 
1
 Participation rate in percent; 
2
 Cost efficiency calculated as quality points per £ of govt. expenditure on 
contracts; 
3
 Social efficiency calculated as quality points per £ of farmer costs through taking on a contract 
Notice also from Table 8, that the social efficiency of the auction is always superior to that of the median 
price scheme. That result follows from the fact that the fixed price scheme is unable to award contracts 
to those with costs above the fixed price even if those farmers can also offer excellent environmental 
quality. 
Finally, in the last three columns of Table 8 we consider a scenario in which the transaction costs of 
participating in the auction exceed those of non-auction alternatives. In particular, we imagine a 
situation in which participation in the fixed price scheme imposes half the transaction cost on farmers as 
participation in the auction. Naturally, with lower transaction costs the cost efficiency and social 
efficiency of the fixed price scheme increase, but observe that the auction continues to perform better 
in terms of cost-efficiency across each of the five years of the scheme. 
Conclusion 
The simulation environment provides a strong endorsement for employing an auction mechanism for 
the allocation of agri-environment contracts. In all cases, our simulations based on cost data from the 
Farm Business Survey suggest that an auction outperforms the most likely alternative mechanism; a 
scheme offering a fixed price set at around the central cost.  Of course, there is no guarantee that the 
distribution of costs used in this analysis will reflect the distribution of costs amongst farmers bidding in 
some particular agri-environment auction. The relative efficiency of the auction compared to a fixed 
price alternative depends on the cost distribution, an issue we turn to address in the next section. 
2.4.4 The Crucial Role of Cost-Distribution Assumptions 
In this section, we wish to sound a note of caution by stressing that this conclusion is very much 
dependent on our assumptions regarding the distribution of costs (and quality) being reasonable 
reflections of reality. To understand how things might differ under alternative assumptions consider the 
analyses graphed in Figure 10 which depict the outcomes of different mechanism under three 
alternative simulations of cost distributions.  







Figure 10: Comparison of pricing and quantity outcomes for three different simulated cost distributions with 
transaction costs of £20 
Figure 10 depicts the outcomes of different mechanisms under three alternative simulations of cost 
distributions. The top row describes outcomes for a simulated cost distribution defined on the range 
between £400 and £600. In this distribution there are a large number of farmers with the lowest cost 
and even more with the highest cost, and the cost distribution rises steeply over the range where the 
marginal contract is likely to be found. Since more than 50% of farms have the top cost, the median 
price takes on this upper boundary and performs particularly poorly returning a cost-efficiency of just 
0.181. Not surprisingly, the cost-efficiency of the auction is significantly larger at 0.216 and, as with the 
FBS data, we find the auction also out-performs the optimal fixed price scheme. 
The middle row of Figure 10 plots outcomes for a simulation in which farm costs are distributed 
uniformly across the same range from £400 to £600. With this cost distribution we see a very different 
outcome with almost identical cost-efficiency being achieved by the two mechanisms.  
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Finally, the cost distribution underpinning the graphs in the bottom row of Figure 10 has a large number 
of low-cost farms with just a small group of relatively higher-cost providers. In this case, we find that the 
auction performs the worst of the two mechanisms. 
We reiterate the clear warning that the value of the insights provided by the analyses reported in 
previous sections is highly dependent on the realism of the assumptions made regarding the 
distribution of costs and quality. 
2.5 All or Nothing and Pick and Mix Auction Formats 
An extension to the auction format described above introduces the complexity of allowing for two 
different activities in the agri-environment scheme. Our particular interest is in situations where the 
government would like to encourage farmers to undertake both activities on their farm since the 
combination of activities delivers additional environmental benefits. In order to encourage the uptake of 
both activities (and following the advice of the project steering group) we consider a scheme in which 
the government confers a bonus of 25pts on to the quality score of a farmer bidding for both activities. 
Clearly the bonus increases the VFM of such bids and hence increases a farmer’s chance of being 
successful in the auction. 
As a simple illustration, consider the case where each farmer has two fields. Under agricultural 
production, the fields generate different incomes; if a field is entered into an agri-environment scheme 
the income from this field is foregone. Under our hypothetical agri-environment scheme, each farmer’s 
first field is only eligible for activity A, while their second field is only eligible for activity B. For simplicity, 
we assume that for one farmer the environmental benefit conveyed by activities A and B is the same, 
but that that benefit differs across farmers. That simplification, permits differences in potential value for 
money across the two fields but allows us to focus on the role of differences in foregone income; as 
such, the extension to heterogeneous qualities is trivial.  
Our analysis explores the question of how to elicit bids for multiple items in an auction. In particular, we 
focus on two potential elicitation formats which we refer to as (i) an All or Nothing format and (ii) a Pick 
and Mix format.  
In an All-or-Nothing format, farmers enter a single bid, which describes whether they are offering to do 
one, the other, or both activities. The All or Nothing format forces bidders to choose between one of 
three potential bid options: bid for activity A; bid for activity B; or bid for activities A and B together. Of 
course, a bid for activities A and B together prompts the award of the 25pt quality bonus, a fact that 
may encourage uptake of that option. 
In contrast, the Pick and Mix format allows farmers to provide a bid for activity A and a bid for activity B, 
and forces the bid for both to equal the sum of those two bids. The government decides whether to 
accept one, both or none of those bids on the basis of VFM. Again the value of a farmer undertaking 
both activities is reflected in the VFM of that combined option being evaluated after the addition of 
25pt quality bonus. The Pick and Mix format removes some of the risk to farmers, enabling them to bid 
on both options independently and allowing the government to select bids in such a way as to reap the 
benefits of potential quality bonuses. 
Since foregone incomes differ across farmers’ fields, their quality-for-cost for each activity is also likely 
to differ. Their decision as to how to bid is shaped by the trade-off between asking for a lower payment 
in order to increase the probability of winning and asking for a higher payment so as to increase the size 
of payment if that bid is successful. With the All or Nothing format farmers evaluate this trade-off for all 
three possible combinations of bid (i.e. A only, B only, or A and B together) electing to put forward that 
particular bid which maximises their expected profit. With a Pick and Mix format a farmer’s task is 
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reduced to determining the value of their bid for A and the value of their bid for B, taking into account 
the range of possible winning outcomes.  
Despite the quality bonus, in an ‘All or Nothing’ auction, competition and risk aversion act to push 
farmers towards bidding for their highest VFM option rather than to bid for both options together. This 
behaviour is clearly identified in Figure 11, where we plot data from a simulation that summarises how 
bidding choice amongst our simulated farmers differs according to how their quality-for-cost for activity 
A compares to that from activity B. In this example, foregone agricultural income from the two fields in 
which the different activities are undertaken is uncorrelated. The three curves in Figure 11 plot the 
proportion of farmers deciding to submit a bid for A and B (solid line), only A (dashed line) and only B 
(dot-dash line) at each level of difference between the quality-for-costs of the two activities undertaken 
in the different fields. So farmers to the left of the graph can offer much higher quality-for-cost for 
activity B than for activity A, while for those to the right of the graph the opposite is true. 
 
 
Figure 11: How the proportion of farmers choosing different combinations of bid relates to the size of the difference 
in quality-for-cost for activity A and Activity B. The opportunity costs of the activities are uncorrelated 
Observe that in an All or Nothing auction format, farmers who can offer a better bid for activity B tend 
to offer only B, concerned that adding activity A to their bid will reduce their competitiveness in the 
auction. Likewise those who can offer a relatively good bid for activity A, tend to choose the safer option 
of just bidding for A. Only when the quality-for-cost for the two activities is very similar does the 25pt 
bonus provide sufficient incentive for farmers to risk bidding for both activities.   
Table 9 presents details from a series of simulations of the All or Nothing format auction and compares 
those to simulations with identical set ups run with a Pick and Mix format auction. With the Pick and Mix 
format, of course, there is no risk associated with bidding for both activities since bids for the two 
activities are entered and evaluated separately. We observe, that the Pick and Mix format is reliably 
more cost efficient than the All or Nothing format. Interestingly, the two auction formats perform 
similarly in terms of social efficiency; this indicates that the difference in format has little impact on the 
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Table 9: Performance of Pick and Mix, All or Nothing auction formats 
 Multiple Agri-environmental Activities (bonus = 25) 
Auction format 
Negatively correlated 
foregone incomes  
Un-correlated 
foregone incomes  
Positively correlated 
foregone incomes 
Cost Eff.3 Social Eff. 
 
Cost Eff.3 Social Eff. 
 
Cost Eff.3 Social Eff. 











It is notable that both mechanisms perform less efficiently when the opportunity cost of activities A and 
B are negatively correlated, such that a low opportunity cost of undertaking one activity is, on average, 
associated with a high cost of undertaking the other, causing the difference in potential VFMs to be 
larger. This large difference in potential VFM leads to specialisation in either A or B, therefore removing 
the benefits of the quality bonus and reducing efficiency.  
In conclusion, we find that a Pick and Mix auction format provides greater efficiency than an All or 
Nothing format by removing an element of risk for bidders and allowing them to offer a broader 
menu of bids from which the government can choose.   
2.6 Target-Constrained Auctions 
Our second major set of analyses concern target-constrained auctions. While the simulation 
environment was developed to allow for analysis of target-constrained auctions, the time constraints of 
this project mean that here we are only able to present findings from our experimental investigations.  
The target-constrained auctions are designed to emulate situations in which the objective is to deliver 
specific environmental targets within some particular landscape. In this case, there is no repetition of 
auctions over the 5 year time frame. Instead, in the first year subjects compete in a one-off auction for 5 
year contracts. If a target number of eligible bids are received in that auction then those bids offering 
the best VFM are selected for funding. If the target is not achieved then the auction was deemed a 
failure and no contracts were funded. As with all the other experimental auctions, a small participation 
cost was associated with entering a bid in the auction. 
2.6.1 Target Auction: Small Targets 
Table 10 summarises the outcomes of a series of auctions which sought to reach the reasonably modest 
target of funding 6 out of the 16. Results from three designs are reported. First a one-shot auction 
where the target is met at the first attempt or the auction fails and is not rerun. Second, a ‘Two-Period’ 
auction format. Once the first period closes, subjects are provided with full information feedback on the 
bids that currently occupy the winning places. The auction then opens for further bids or revision of bids 
before closing for good at the end of the second period. Finally, we explore a ‘Follow-Up’ auction format 
in which a second auction is run if and only if the first auction fails to garner enough eligible bids to 
reach the target. 
Observe from Table 10Table 10 that in all cases subjects were able to reach the relatively small target, 
though in one case the follow-up auction was called into play in order to achieve that goal. Notice also 
the significant difference in rates of participation across the different formats. In particular, participation 
in the one-shot target auction is appreciably lower than in the other formats; while participation is 
somewhat greater in the follow-up auction and greater still in the two-period auction. That ordering of 
participation rates reflects the differences in risk that subjects face when weighing-up the merits of 
bidding in the auction and paying the participation cost, only to discover that the auction has failed 
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because too few other farmers have entered bids to reach the target. In the follow-up auction format 
farmers know that the auction will be rerun in the event of such a failure and in the two-period auction, 
the auction cannot fail until the second period has completed. 
Table 10: Performance Measures for Target-Constrained Auctions with a Small Target 
Measure One-Shot 
Two-Period  Follow-Up 
Prd 1 Prd 2  Initial Follow-Up 
Success 100% 100% 100%  83% 100% 
Participation 61% 81% 90%  68% 70% 
Social Efficiency  15.44 13.76 14.03  14.98 15.03 
Cost Efficiency 14.36 12.52 13.37  13.97 14.07 
 
Those differences in risk seem to also guide bidding behaviour. Observe that bidding in the one-shot 
auction is the most competitive, resulting in the highest level of cost-efficiency amongst the small-target 
auctions (14.36 pts/£). The follow-up format where at each stage of the auction there remains a chance 
of being out-competed, records marginally worse cost efficiency (14.07 pts/£). Finally, the two-period 
format records the lowest cost-efficiency (13.37 pts/£). Here bids in the initial period carry very little risk 
since they can always be revised in the second period. Accordingly, those first round bids are the most 
speculatively exaggerated (cost efficiency; 12.52 pts/£).  
For small targets, therefore, a one-shot auction dominates other possible designs though the Follow-
Up auction format provides reasonably comparable performance. 
2.6.2 One-Shot Target Auctions: Large Targets 
Table 11 records the same performance statistics for a series of experimental auctions in which the 
intention is to distribute contracts to a large target of 12 out of 16 farmers. In this section we focus 
attention on three formats that each only afford one bidding opportunity. The first is a simple one-shot 
auction. The second is a target auction with an additional budget constraint. The final format is one in 
which subjects not only compete with each other but with neighbouring “regions” (for which read 
groups of 8 subjects) to secure funding. 






Success 50% 25% 75% 
Participation 74% 67% 66% 
Social Efficiency 13.46 11.41 13.38 
Cost Efficiency 12.38 12.11 13.03 
 
A potential issue with auctions seeking to issue a large number of contracts is that the existence of a 
large target releases competitive pressures that keep a cap on bids. The auction formats explored in this 
section were designed with the intention of introducing alternative sources of competitive pressure in 
order to avoid that eventuality. However, the first row of Table 11 makes for uncomfortable reading. 
We find that half of the time, these large target auctions fail due to an insufficient number of subjects 
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submitting bids. Clearly for many subjects the added competitive pressures in these formats designed to 
avoid excessive bidding simply encourages non-participation.  
2.6.3 Two-Shot Target Auction: Large Targets 
While one-shot auction mechanisms proved to perform poorly in trying to achieve a large target, two-
shot mechanisms perform considerably better. Consider the summary details documented in Table 
12Table 12. Here we see that in both the first period of a two-period auction and in the initial run of a 
follow-up auction format we again fail regularly to reach the target. However, with both these formats, 
that failure is not the end of the auction. Information on the bids received in either the first period or 
the initial auction are made available to subjects who may use that information in considering how to 
bid in the subsequent auction. This subsequent auction successfully achieves the target on every 
occasion.  
Comparing the Two-Period and the Follow-Up auction we observe (as we did in the small target case) 
that bids in the first period of the Two-Period format and the initial auction of the Follow-Up format 
exceed those received in the subsequent auction. We suspect that is because subjects bidding in that 
subsequent auction know that there will be no further opportunities to secure a contract; if they bid too 
high and do not get selected for funding. Notice also that bidding in the Follow-Up format is more 
competitive than in the Two-Period format; the former results in a cost-efficiency score of 11.47, the 
latter a score of 11.89. 
Table 12: Performance Measures for One-Shot Target-Constrained Auctions with a Large Target 
Measure One-Shot 
Two-Period  Follow-Up 
Prd 1 Prd 2  Initial Follow-Up 
Success 50% 50% 100%  67% 100% 
Participation 74% 80% 91%  87% 91% 
Social Efficiency 13.46 14.03 14.38  14.47 14.50 
Cost Efficiency 12.38 11.76 11.47  12.19 11.89 
 
Again we speculate that that performance advantage arises from the relatively higher risks associated 
with bidding in the Follow-Up format. Even in the first auction of that format, subjects must enter a bid 
that they believe has a reasonable chance of being selected; if they bid too high then the target may be 
reached through the bids of other farmers and the format will not progress to the follow-up auction. 
As a result, the experimental data points to the conclusion that where relatively large targets are 
sought, a two-shot auction possibly formulated in the Follow-Up format will tend to dominate one-
shot designs. Moreover, the Follow-Up format tends to perform relatively well even when a small target 
is required making a strong case for adoption of the Follow-Up format for implementation of target 
auctions in Countryside Stewardship. 
2.7 Conclusions 
With the major caveat that the findings of the simulation analysis are dependent on the realism of the 
calibration of the simulator, particularly in defining the distribution of costs, we reach a number of clear 
conclusions.  
First, we find that within our simulation an auction provides better cost-efficiency than an alternative 
scheme which offers a fixed price set around the centre of the cost distribution. We are careful to note 
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that this conclusion is very much dependent on our assumptions regarding the distribution of costs (and 
quality) being reasonable reflections of reality. 
Second, we find that there are good reasons to support the provision of feedback on the VFM of 
winning bids between successive years of agri-environment auctions. While this information provides 
high quality-for-cost farmers with cause to shade up their bids, it also encourages participation from 
farmers that are capable of offering good VFM bids. That increased participation adds to increasing 
competition between farmers at the competitive margin encouraging that group to enter progressively 
better VFM bids. In our simulation, feeding back on VFM leads to higher cost efficiency and higher social 
efficiency than schemes that limit the information shared with farmers between auctions.  
Third, in both our simulations and experiments we find evidence to suggest that auction outcomes can 
be manipulated by the publication of guide prices. That impact is not large and erodes over successive 
years of auctions as information on the VFM of actual winners is fed back to participants. The impact of 
guide prices tends to have contrasting participation and bidding effects. It appears that the primary 
benefit of a guide price is in increasing participation in the first year of the scheme. With regards to 
setting the level of a guide price a sensible strategy is to fix that price around a truthful estimate of the 
likely marginal bid. Such a guide price encourages participation from those farmers who are on the 
competitive fringe while discouraging participation from non-competitive farmers. Likewise, a guide 
price set at that level will give relatively little encouragement to highly competitive farmers to shade up 
their bids. 
Fourth, in our simulations of budget-constrained auctions for two agri-environment activities we find 
evidence to suggest that a Pick and Mix auction format (where farmers submit one bid for activity A and 
one bid for activity B and could be successful in none, one or both bids) leads to greater efficiency than 
an All or Nothing format (where farmers are forced to submit a single bid for either activity A, activity B 
or both activities A and B). The efficiency gains of a Pick and Mix format are greater when the 
opportunity costs of activities A and B are positively correlated or uncorrelated and the efficiency gains 
are lower when the costs are negatively correlated.  
Finally, in a landscape-scale target auction, the experimental evidence favours the use of a Follow-Up 
auction format. We find that such a format maintains sufficient competition to ensure bids are not 
inflated in the initial round while lowering the risks of participation by holding out the possibility of a 
follow-up auction if the target is not initially achieved. The Follow-Up format performs well in both the 
small target and large target setting, suggesting that it may be robust to a number of different target 
auction settings. 
Overall, and with the now familiar caveat, our simulations and experiments suggest that an auction 
mechanism could offer efficiency advantages over a fixed price scheme. Those advantages are most 
pronounced when there is widespread participation in the scheme. Since transaction costs deter 
participation, the simulations suggest that reducing the transaction costs of participating in an auction 
is an important consideration. A second way to encourage participation is to reduce some of the 
uncertainty over the likelihood of success; an outcome that might be achieved through the provision 
of guide prices and publicising the VFMs of winning bidders. Clearly the challenge here is to release 
enough information to encourage participation without releasing so much information that high-
bidding is encouraged amongst farmers that might otherwise offer high VFM. 
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3 Farmer workshops on reverse auctions 
Two workshops were held with farmers in Yorkshire in summer 2014 to explore attitudes to the use of 
reverse auctions for allocation of funding under the new environmental land management scheme 
‘Countryside Stewardship’, which will succeed Environmental Stewardship in England under RDPE 2014-
2020. The aim was to test farmers’ views on the concept of an auction process and explore responses 
through a bidding exercise across at least two farming contexts, in this case upland livestock farmers 
and lowland arable farmers.  The participants were recruited around existing groups known to ADAS in 
the region on the basis that this would secure attendance and provide a familiar context for farmers to 
contribute openly and fully.  Additional information is provided in annex 4. 
As part of the process, it was necessary to introduce the move to Countryside Stewardship where access 
to funding for managing the environment will be based on targeting and spatial scoring. In hindsight, 
this proved a challenging concept for many farmers and meant that they found it difficult to separate it 
from the mechanism for allocation of funds, namely reverse auctions. 
3.1 Farmer responses 
Uplands workshop 
This small focus group of 12 upland farmers found the concept of reverse actions for agri-environment 
schemes difficult to grasp and take part in but they provided valuable feedback for the study. In the 
context of the research study, the key issues raised by farmers were: 
 Farmers’ capacity to participate in an auction system, in terms of using the IT infrastructure 
effectively, was challenged.  
 A 5-year auction-based system is at odds with securing long term environmental goals. 
 A risk of ‘trading down’ in payment rates to secure an agreement. 
 A risk of collusion at a local scale where individual agents acted on behalf of neighbouring 
farmers. 
 Inability of small family farmers to compete on cost with non-farming land owners with 
economies of scale. 
Arable workshop 
This small focus group of 10 arable and mixed farmers were not enthusiastic about the concept of 
targeting Countryside Stewardship through environmental scoring. The issue of bidding under an 
auction system was an additional complication which they did not perceive as an opportunity to 
negotiate the new rules. However, they did take part in bidding rounds and have provided valuable 
feedback for the study.  
In the context of the research study, the key issues raised are: 
 Importance of setting the value for money threshold at an appropriate level.  
 The ability to enhance scores by bundling options. 
 In some instances farmers did not bid. 
 Perverse incentive to bid low and cut costs of establishment and management of options.  
 Loss of currently secure environmental outcomes when farmers fall out of agreements. 
 Large scale farmers and contractors with economies of scale will be favoured over family farms.  
 A more complex bidding process would increase reliance on agents or advisers.  
 Issues of poor access to broadband might limit participation in an online auction process. 
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3.2 Implications for the use of reverse auctions  
There are a number of common themes across the two workshops which need to be considered in a 
piloting phase, namely: 
i. The context for accessing agri-environment schemes. It will be important that the new 
competitive Countryside Stewardship scheme is in place ahead of any piloting of auctions so 
that the competitive element is not associated only with the auction mechanism. 
ii. The platform used for bidding should be easy to use and avoid the need to undertake complex 
calculations on value for money. 
iii. The environmental scoring element should be transparent and robust (able to withstand 
challenge) at a farm scale. 
iv. Information on previous successful bidding rounds, guide prices etc. should be made available 
(within the constraints of the design elements being tested) so that farmers can anchor their 
bids and to encourage participation from farmers that are capable of offering good VFM bids. 
v. The pilots should explore opportunities to allow farmers to combine options e.g. as bundles, to 
secure uptake of a coherent set of options at farm and landscape level, including more difficult 
options. 
vi. The pilots should explore opportunities to allow farmers to commit to longer timescales (> 5 
years) to test the impact on participation and VFM. 
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4 Linking agri-environment and wider PES initiatives 
Until recently, most finance available to farmers for ecosystem maintenance and enhancement has 
been made through publicly funded schemes. More recently, the private sector has come forward with 
initiatives to offer finance, in conjunction with public funds, for land managers to improve water quality 
(Upstream Thinking6 and Catchment Wise7) and to sequester carbon (Woodland Carbon Code8). In 
theory public and private finance could be brought together in different ways to encourage the desired 
changes to land management. For instance: 
 private finance could be used to introduce new options to agri-environment schemes, or make 
existing options more financially attractive to farmers; 
 projects could combine funding from a variety of funding sources e.g. from agri-environment 
schemes and from selling carbon credits through the new Peatland Carbon Code9. 
There are potentially a number of advantages in designing a public environmental land management 
scheme that allows the inclusion of private funding (see section 4.1).  However, for a jointly funded 
scheme both public and private sector criteria  would need to be met; for the public agency this relates 
in particular to EU funding rules while for the private agent, funding may be much more flexible. Public 
schemes are also likely to cover a wide range of environmental objectives while those for a private agent 
may be very specific and limited.  
In considering the potential models for integrating funding, the project team interviewed a number of 
private sector stakeholders that would potentially be interested in PES schemes to ascertain their 
readiness to participate (detailed at annex 5).  Smith et al (2013) identify three types of potential buyers 
of ecosystem services10 – Primary, Secondary and Tertiary buyers – according to the point at which they 
benefit from use of the ecosystem services. For this analysis we have characterised the businesses 
interviewed under three discrete groups based on their use of the engagement with PES concepts: 
1. PES Ready: the water companies are actively engaged in seeking improvements to ecosystem 
services (water quality) by working directly with land managers and interested third parties.  The 
focus is very location specific. 
2. Investors in ecosystem services: food producers and retailers have ongoing engagement with 
land managers.  This is mostly productivity driven but there is interest in achieving more with 
their current investments for a broad set of objectives that include supply chain resilience as 
well as landscape scale impacts. The focus is local to international. 
3. PES Interested: this category includes developers and the insurance industry who were less 
closely linked with land managers but have an interest in the principles of managing land to 
support their wider objectives. The focus is site specific. 
                                                          
6
 A South West Water initiative started in 2008 to improve water quality through land management 
http://upstreamthinking.org/  
7
 A United Utilities initiative to tackle pollution at source to improve the quality across the North West 
http://corporate.unitedutilities.com/catchmentwise.aspx  
8
 Forestry Commission (2011) Co-funding of woodland creation through EWGS and carbon finance at: 
www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/ON020-EWGS&CarbonFinance.pdf/$file/ON020-EWGS&CarbonFinance.pdf  
9
 A pilot study for Defra on developing a Peatland Code suggests that joint funding of peatland restoration from 
both private funding and agri-environment schemes would be possible, but that further investigation is needed 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=11566_DefraPESPilotPeatCodeFinalReport.pdf  
10
 Our health and wellbeing depends upon the services provided by ecosystems and their components: water, soil, 
nutrients and organisms. Therefore, ecosystem services are the processes by which the environment produces 
resources utilised by humans such as clean air, water, food and materials. 
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This chapter focusses principally on the PES Ready group, namely water companies.  This is partly driven 
by the relatively advanced stage of their interest but also reflects their urgent need to build an evidence 
base on the effectiveness of land management activities in mitigating non-point sources of pollution 
that affect water quality.  More details regarding the interviews can be found in annex 5. 
In the following sections we consider: 
 Some simple models that could bring together public and private funding for agri-environment 
schemes; 
 The requirements of respective private and public funds for investment in agri-environment 
activities that would need to be addressed for a joint public-private scheme to work.  These 
relate to both the concerns of the private stakeholders as well as the EU requirements for the 
public scheme; 
 Consideration of the models against the requirements; 
 Next steps. 
4.1 Models for public/private funding of agri-environment schemes 
Below we describe three elements of scheme design that are relevant when considering how public and 
private schemes could be linked.  These are: independent or combined schemes; independent or 
brokered/co-ordinated purchasing; and the rules of purchasing. 
Independent or combined schemes 
Most simply, the combination of public and private funding of schemes under a single administration 
could result in administrative cost savings for all parties. A further advantage could arise from providing 
farmers and land managers with a single interface to agri-environment funding that minimises the 
transactional costs of making applications. More ambitiously, a joint private and public design opens up 
the possibility of coordinating the two streams of investment to bring efficiency benefits for both 
parties, achieving the same environmental benefits at a lower cost or greater benefits at the same cost.   
Conceptually one can think of the two funding streams being combined or managed in parallel. A 
number of potential issues need to be considered, namely: 
 Risk of competition in effort and issues of overlap or gaps in provision - at the very least an 
element of coordination is required.   
 Opportunities for coherence and synergy between environmental objectives may be missed. For 
example, pursuit of one objective through private funding may be at the detriment of another 
for which there is only public funding.   
 Separate schemes could be confusing for applicants.   
 Private agents ready to consider joint schemes with the public authority typically have limited 
experience of operating schemes of this type. 
 Options offered under the existing publicly funded scheme rely on implementation of 
management practices but outcomes are often difficult to measure; this may prove a limitation 
for private agents.   
 The spatial scale for the existing publicly funded scheme may not coincide with the area of most 
interest to private argents.   
 The requirements that the public scheme imposes e.g. that the options implemented are 
verifiable and controllable may be restrictive for a private agent.  
 Timeframes for funding may be different for private and public schemes.  
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Independent or Brokered Purchasing 
Within a combined scheme, private agents could either act as entirely independent buyers or the public 
agency and private agencies could agree to coordinate their buying activities. If acting independently, a 
combined scheme would present private and public agencies with the opportunity to review farmers’ 
applications and select which applications they wish to finance. Given the requirements of the public 
scheme, the Managing Authority and/or the Paying Agency would have to play some coordinating role 
particularly in situations where more than one agent wishes to fund a particular application (to avoid 
double-funding). Where the benefits of changing farming activities provide a public good, for example 
by reducing pollution in rivers, free-riding11 problems may arise between the different purchasing 
agents. In that case the level of financing could be less than optimal.  
One way of overcoming these problems would be for public and private funders to coordinate their 
purchasing. In order to achieve that, a set of purchasing rules would have to be agreed in advance. The 
rules would define how each agent wanted to see their funds used and how decisions should be made 
on their allocation under different circumstances. With such a set of rules in place, a (possibly 
independent) broker would make the decisions on behalf of all agents, taking advantage of possible 
synergies to choose applications that mean that all agents benefit from the cooperation. 
Purchasing Rules  
It seems likely that those private agents ready to participate in a combined scheme will be interested in 
financing a specific subset of the options offered in a public scheme and may be limited to a particular 
geography.   
A number of possible purchasing rules might apply, including: 
 The private agent offers a budget and seeks to finance as many agreements as possible that 
deliver that option in their target region;  
 The private agent makes a fixed (percentage) contribution to the costs of all applications that 
the government decides to finance which deliver the private agent’s options in their target 
region (perhaps up to some predetermined budget cap). 
Given the uncertainties associated with environmental change there is also an issue of evidencing 
outcomes.  For example, water companies will wish to see improvements in water quality from funding 
changes to farming practice but the causal link to actions from specific farms may be difficult to verify.  
Other private agents may be seeking to strengthen the resilience of their supply chain through the 
environmental performance of farmer suppliers.  Again it may be necessary to use proxies for delivering 
environmental improvements rather than rely on actual measurements at a farm scale. While individual 
parties will often take a pragmatic view on the causality between supported actions and outcomes, this 
is always more complex when there is joint financing as there is less certainty that each party has 
delivered its end of the bargain effectively. 
Public/private models 
There are a number of public/private models that could be considered for a joint scheme between 
Countryside Stewardship and water companies. 
 Parallel schemes with limited coordination: Private schemes could run completely independently of 
the public scheme, pursuing their own objectives with specifically designed options, geographic 
                                                          
11
 The free rider problem occurs when those who benefit from resources, goods, or services do not pay for them, 
which results in either an under-provision of those goods or services, or in an overuse or degradation of a common 
property resource. 
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focus and payment mechanisms. Coordination would rely on sharing scheme details and events and 
having representatives on steering groups, for example. 
 Co-ordinated but separate public and private schemes: Water companies and the public agent 
coordinate outside the public scheme e.g. Countryside Stewardship funds channelled into targeted 
schemes co-ordinated by water companies, catchment partnerships or trusted third party brokers. 
 Joint administration of separate public and private schemes (through the public scheme): Water 
companies use the administrative apparatus of Countryside Stewardship and specify additional 
options that they would fund separately from the agri-environment funds.  Such a scheme would 
provide a combined interface to farmers and could extend to a common monitoring and evaluation 
framework, allowing for further cost sharing. 
 Joint public / private purchasing (within the public scheme): Water companies and the public agent 
coordinate within the public scheme apparatus with, for example, particular options being co-
funded by the water company and Countryside Stewardship. 
4.2 Barriers to and requirements for a public/private model 
General barriers to funding land management change 
Below we describe the requirements that a model for a joint scheme would need to address from the 
private and public perspectives.  First, we outline some of the barriers expressed during the interviews 
with the water companies and other stakeholders. While these do not relate to a particular model for a 
joint scheme, they apply generally to PES and in that sense are in common with the barriers from the 
perspective of the public agent. These issues and challenges are well known in the PES literature. 
 Additionality: The term additionality is used to mean the degree of environmental benefit which is 
secured by a policy over and above that which would have happened anyway in the absence of the 
intervention. A key issue relates to payments to secure particular management practices or 
maintain environmental stocks under agri-environment schemes. In some cases, where this 
management is consistent with the land manager’s objectives, there are no opportunity costs for 
the activity and theoretically no additional benefits from the funding. 
 Polluter pays principle: This principle dictates that the party responsible for producing pollution is 
responsible for paying for the damage done to the environment. Many of the water companies 
expressed concern over whether they, as the direct recipients of the negative externality from 
agriculture, should pay farmers to reduce pollutants.  In addition, the water companies were wary of 
setting a precedent for a future stream of payments to farmers to reduce a problem not of their 
making.    
 Free riding: This relates to situations where some parties can benefit from a good or service without 
paying anything (or making a contribution less than their benefit) and thus the good or service will 
be underprovided.  Where the benefits from investment in land management options are accessible 
to all (e.g. carbon) and/or more intangible (e.g. biodiversity) some businesses may shy away from 
funding actions where the benefits are shared with others.  For example, the insurance sector is 
interested in options to reduce flood risk but the gains from, for example, tree planting are available 
to all those downstream including householders who can buy their insurance from a range of 
competing businesses. The exception is where the act of funding per se has value in terms of 
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corporate social responsibility (CSR), which could, for example, relate to businesses investing in the 
Woodland or Peatland Carbon Code to create a verifiable asset of the carbon savings.  
 Strategic behaviour:  Linked to the polluter pays principle12 are issues of potential strategic response 
to funding on the behalf of private agents, including farmers.  These issues are well illustrated with 
the need to reduce pesticides from water where it was noted that it could be in the sector’s interest 
to demonstrate that it is too difficult and expensive to remove pesticides from water and that the 
best solution is for the regulator to take them off the market.  The flip side of this consideration 
could be the desire of the agro-chemical companies to maintain the lifetime of their products by 
contributing to a scheme to reduce use or enhance efficiency of use.  In addition, it was suggested 
that there is potential for moral hazard13 to arise i.e. if the land manager knows they can receive 
funding to reduce the use of specific substances, they may be tempted to use them in order to 
access the funding. 
Private agent requirements 
The interviews with water companies highlighted a number of concerns over joint funding of agri-
environment schemes: 
• Choice of management options available:  there was some debate as to the efficacy and 
appropriateness of the options available in current agri-environment scheme (Environmental 
Stewardship) in terms of delivering the changes in ecosystem services required.  This extends beyond 
the management prescription and includes option location and timing.  Countryside Stewardship may 
be more attractive and we note the Catchment Wise scheme developed by United Utilities appears 
to utilise a number of agri-environment like management options (see annex 5);  
• Relationship with farmers: both the water companies and food supply chain businesses work directly 
with farmers within their catchment or supply chain and have established relationships over a period 
of years.  Water companies do not wish to lose this direct contact especially as the location of the 
ecosystem service provider is key.  This is less important for food chain businesses and the issue of 
losing contact did not come to the fore.  Retailers can have long term relationships with farmers but 
these are associated with shorter term contracts and therefore the provider of the ecosystem service 
is more dynamic;  
• Regulatory environment:  The water companies have recently submitted their Asset Management 
Plans (AMP6) as part of the 2014 price review (PR14). Written into those plans are the water 
companies’ requests for funding catchment management schemes over the period 2015-20. Over 
this period, the focus for water companies would be through the development of small-scale pilots 
designed to test the efficacy of such a scheme. The initial statement of principles for PR14 (which 
occur every 5 years – see https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr14/milestones/) were laid out in 
May 2012 suggesting that, if a similar process is to occur, such revised principles for PR19 would be 
laid out in 2017. 
                                                          
12
 The polluter pays principle is enacted to make the party responsible for producing pollution responsible for 
paying for the damage done to the natural environment. 
13
 Moral hazard occurs when one person takes more risks because someone else bears the burden of those risks. 
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Public scheme requirements 
EU funds can only be disbursed in compliance with a number of conditions to deliver objectives and 
prevent fraud.  The new EU agri-environment programme (2014-2020) requires that management 
options are verifiable and controllable and an ex-ante assessment is required to this end.  The guidance 
fiche14 on the verifiability and controllability of measures highlights a number of issues relating to the 
root causes of errors in the implementation of measures. The issues of interest for Agri-environment-
climate are: 
 Commitments difficult to verify and/or control:  these can relate to conditions on maximum or 
minimum livestock densities; actions to be completed by a specific date; actions to be completed at 
a moment that cannot be defined in advance (e.g. before harvest); reductions in input usage over all 
or part of a farm.  The guidance states that additional care is required to ensure a satisfactory level 
of verification or control.  It further states that the Managing Authority should consider an 
appropriate combination of IT checks under the administrative checks and on-the-spot checks as a 
better toolkit for verification  
 Pre-conditions as eligibility conditions: Pre-conditions such as minimum livestock density need to be 
verified at the application phase to include or exclude the beneficiary from the support. This “yes-
no” condition is subject to 100% withdrawal of support in the case of non-compliance. 
 IT systems: these are important to minimise risks and improve controllability and verifiability of the 
measures and can support any stage of the grant cycle.  They can include information, payment 
claims, document submission, alert systems, checks and controls etc.  
 Payment claims: In addition to the verifiability and controllability requirements, the amount that can 
be paid for a management option is required to be no more than additional costs and income 
foregone.  The calculations for these must be “adequate and accurate and established in advance on 
the basis of a fair, equitable, and verifiable calculation”.   
Discussion of barriers 
A number of the barriers mentioned by the water companies have parallels with concerns expressed by 
public funders in terms of ensuring value for money from an agri-environment scheme.  The first two of 
the verifiability and controllability issues for EU funding address some aspects of free riding and moral 
hazard by requiring sufficient evidence regarding baseline conditions and proof of activities.  Whether 
this assuages concern from the private stakeholders will depend upon the actual systems in place for 
those commitments that are difficult to verify and pre-conditions for eligibility. 
For the water companies, an assessment of investment in improving water quality (and their responses 
driven by AMP6) is based on securing tangible outcomes and may not necessarily be true for other 
private agents.  A joint public/private scheme with water companies relies on an economic case in 
absolute or relative terms while the public agent would need an absolute or relative gain in 
environmental quality and value for money in terms of expenditure.   
The timescales required by the water companies (in terms of longevity of the phases of the Upstream 
Thinking projects for example) are of the same order as for the public scheme.  Given that the 
ecosystem service (water quality) is tangible and location specific, the commitment would be ongoing 
while the management options maintain their relative cost effectiveness.  For other potential PES 
                                                          
14
 Activity report Document 15 from the EU Expert Group for Rural Development (E02732) 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2732&NewSearch=1&NewSearc
h=1  
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stakeholders, the focus for investment could be more transitory e.g. due to the emergence of 
alternative options or to a change in business strategy, ownership, or fortunes.  Such changes in 
circumstances may also apply to the public funder e.g. in response to changes in policy priorities or 
availability of funding over time.  
The income foregone requirements may limit uptake by a critical mass of landowners where the cost of 
participation is greater than an individual’s income foregone, undermining impact at catchment level.  
Also, some catchments may have costs associated with management options that are higher than the 
public scheme rates and could make a joint scheme unworkable. Interestingly an auction approach to 
allocating funding might usefully address this issue of variable cost of participation, provided the income 
forgone payment rates can be exceeded. 
Overall, the barriers noted are consistent with a recent report for the Welsh Government (Cascade 
Consulting, 2014) which engaged with stakeholders on PES and other mechanisms. The analysis 
concluded that buyers will be convinced of the benefits from a PES approach if they can see that a 
scheme will: 
 reduce current costs of production (e.g. for water companies provide a cost effective solution 
compared to end of pipe treatment costs); 
 avoid current and future risks for the business; and 
 improve relations with consumers and enhance brand value and reputation. 
The barriers discussed relate to those businesses that are ready to engage with PES.  As revealed in the 
discussions with other sectors, some have an interest in the concept but are still within the learning 
phase; for these the main barrier is one of information and engagement.  We come back to this point in 
the closing comments of this section. 
Potential Issues with the Models 
The models for public/private funding introduced in section 5.1, are reviewed below in terms of the 
barriers and requirements outlined above. 
Co-ordinated but separate public and private schemes: This model would require some mechanism 
capable of coordinating funding and activity.  Governance models applied within Upstream Thinking and 
Catchment Wise could be of interest here in that they include a wide group of local stakeholders and in 
the case of the Exmoor Mires project (in Upstream Thinking), agreed plans were incorporated into 
existing or newly negotiated agri-environment agreements.  Both private and public funders should be 
able to demonstrate greater environmental (and financial) benefit than would be achievable acting 
alone.  
Joint administration of separate public and private schemes (through the public scheme): This cost 
sharing approach may not necessarily lead to sufficient reduced costs to warrant progressing.  The 
private agent may prefer to retain some form of direct contact or “badging” with the land managers and 
the flexibility of a differ set of management options, both of which might reduce potential cost savings.  
The risk of payment problems linked to EU rules may also deter private businesses from joining a single 
administrative system.   
Joint public/private purchasing (within the public scheme): A particular limiting factor for a joint 
purchasing model is the EU funding rule on income foregone. It may be that the water companies can 
top up funding in areas where farmers’ costs are higher than the typical costs as estimated for the public 
scheme.  However, it would be necessary to demonstrate that such payments are “adequate and 
accurate and established in advance on the basis of a fair, equitable, and verifiable calculation”. This 
might entail substantial local effort and administrative burden on behalf of the scheme funders.  For a 
 © ADAS 2014                  46  
  
 
number of management options the public scheme payment has been less than 100% of the estimated 
typical income foregone.  This creates the possibility that the private agent could pay the balance 
without breaking public scheme rules.  The extent to which income foregone issues are surmountable 
within a joint purchasing model are possible within the requirements of the EU scheme needs to be 
explored further.  
4.3 Policy development 
A model for public/private PES funding 
The “traffic lights“ matrix in Table 13 shows the project team’s best estimate of whether the models 
described address the private and public barriers identified.  This simple overview of the basic models 
against the requirements suggests the coordinated purchasing would seem to offer greater scope for 
advancing a joint public/private PES scheme.  It is reassuring that this model has much in common with 
existing models being trialled by the water companies within Catchment Wise and Upstream Thinking.    
Table 13: Models for bringing public and private funding together for agri-environment schemes 



















Option choice Private agent can design and 
administer own options. 
Private agent can design own 
options but these would need 
to be captured by the public 
administration. 
Limited to public scheme 
options only within EU rules. 
Using additional options 
would require a parallel 
procurement process. 
Farmer contact Shared roles to maintain 
contact for both parties? 
Potential loss of contact by 
private agent 




Potentially more efficient / 
effective coordinated 
delivery. 
Admin. Likely to be more 
complex but total costs 
should be reduced. 
 
Income foregone rules may 
limit ability to apply at 









No impact on private options No impact on private options Common for both public and 
private schemes but may be 
issues of definition. 
Income foregone No impact on private options No impact on private options Lack of flexibility for private 
agent to pay above typical 
costs of participation. 
 
Key: 
 Model can fully address the requirements 
 Model can only partially address the requirements 
 Model cannot address the requirements 
 
Mainstreaming public/private PES funding 
To move this concept forward there is a need to both extend and develop the engagement of the 
private sector and to build it into the design of the post-2020 RDP.  The Defra PES Pilot Studies have 
shown that buyers can be engaged with specific local schemes but this is more difficult to achieve when 
discussing such issues more generally and in conjunction with agri-environment schemes.  Whilst there 
is general interest in the ideas, there is a need to provide further detail to potential buyers to more fully 
engage and for them to be able to see the potential more clearly. 
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With regard to increased and early engagement of institutions with an interest in private funding for 
PES, we suggest that government considers recruiting leading companies to contribute to policy 
development in this area, including shaping the post-2020 RDP design.  This parallel development of 
private and public funding elements is key to launching a coordinated public/private PES funding model 
in the next iteration of Countryside Stewardship. 
In the interim, a number of actions should be taken:  
 Explore the scope for coordination of existing PES private and public schemes, using the water 
companies as a test-case.  
o Review the scope and efficacy of Countryside Stewardship options targeted at water 
quality and their ability to deliver water company objectives at a local catchment scale. 
o Identify overlaps and consider how existing water company initiatives can complement 
the public scheme and improve effectiveness and value for money through better 
coordination. 
 Develop a common framework for governance, operation and evaluation of coordinated private 
and public PES.  
o Explore and qualify the legal basis for integration of agri-environment funding with 
private funding.  
o Consider the use of Countryside Stewardship spatial priorities and targeting as a 
framework for highlighting private/public PES funding opportunities. 
o Scope the roles of intermediaries (facilitator/broker) and stakeholders in facilitating 
public/private PES funding schemes and the ‘rules of engagement’. 
o Assess the scope for shared data between public and private schemes (e.g. metrics and 
Indicators of Success) and also common processes (e.g. monitoring and evaluation) and 
how convergence on these might facilitate better joint working and reduce costs. 
o Adopt a transdisciplinary approach and employ co-design/co-development to ensure 
any model is fit for purpose.  
o Set out a roadmap for the three categories of private agents – PES ready, Investors in 
ecosystem services and PES interested – to engage with PES policy. 
o Engage with potential funders to scope complementary and overlapping aims and 
actions – what would they get involved in and how? 
o Recruit a PES panel as observer for auction pilots, post-2020 RDP design and wider 
policy.  
 © ADAS 2014                  48  
  
 
5 Proposals for piloting reverse auctions  
Learning from the scoping work  
In considering proposals for piloting reverse auctions, it is important to build on the evidence that has 
been developed in this project and to refer back to the primary motive for the work, notably securing 
improved value for money for public expenditure in this area.  
The simulation modelling conducted at UEA provides a number of insights into the impacts of various 
elements of auction design for the purposes of allocating agri-environment contracts. More broadly the 
data suggest that a discriminatory price auction (where participants get paid what they bid) provides 
15% better cost-efficiency than an alternative scheme which offers a fixed price set around the centre of 
the cost distribution. The mechanism for this ‘efficiency gain’ is based on a balance between 
encouraging enough people to participate in the auction and ensuring that they base their bids on their 
cost of participation (including transaction costs). This relies on appropriate auction design and would 
be the focus for piloting reverse auctions.  
Evidence from the farmer workshops demonstrated that while farmers found the concept of pricing bids 
challenging, they could participate in the auction process if sufficient information and guidance was 
provided. In the workshops, farmers found feedback on the VFM of winning bids from previous auctions 
particularly useful and this is consistent with the experimental work. Farmers also tested the principle of 
a Pick and Mix auction format to bid for multiple options. 
Key recommendations for auction pilots include: 
 Countryside Stewardship should be in place ahead of auction pilots 
 The platform for bidding should be easy to use 
 The environmental scoring element should be transparent and robust 
 The role of information on previous successful bidding rounds, guide prices etc. should be tested  
 The pilots should explore opportunities for farmers to combine options (if possible) 
 The pilots should explore the impact of longer timescales on participation and VFM 
The wider case for leveraging additional funding from the private sector through the PES principle is in 
many respects a linked but parallel workstream which also needs to be taken forward. Together these 
two components can potentially offer a greater overall budget and efficiencies in how that funding is 
deployed. However, the basis for integrating public and private funding is not a primary priority at this 
point and we recommend that it is first necessary to pilot the reverse auction as a funding mechanism. 
This chapter explores some of the key considerations for implementing pilot auctions with farmers. 
Priorities for reverse auctions pilots 
The experimental auctions and simulation modelling have provided valuable evidence on auction design 
options. On the basis of this work we suggest the following priorities for piloting reverse auctions for 
Countryside Stewards funding in a Mid-Tier: 
1. A discriminatory price auction (where participants get paid what they bid). Within this the 
following elements should be explored: 
a. provision of feedback 
b. guide prices 
c. Pick and Mix vs. All or Nothing format 
2. A landscape-scale target auction, to include research on the use of a Follow-Up auction format. 
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Participants for reverse auctions pilots 
It is evident that moving from the current open access agri-environment scheme under Environmental 
Stewardship to a competitive funding environment under Countryside Stewardship and simultaneously 
testing an auction mechanism risks some conflation of the latter elements. As such, the timing of pilots 
should ideally allow for a settling-in period after the new scheme is launched. However, once the new 
scheme is implemented (from January 2016), securing participants for pilot auctions may prove difficult 
– they would only take part if they had some guarantee that they would not be any worse off (e.g. lower 
payment rates than under CS or failure to secure an agreement agreement) – which might prove 
complex and expensive.  
Nevertheless, there are some groups that might be used for piloting on the basis that they cannot 
participate in the new Countryside Stewardship scheme in the next few years. These include: 
i. Farmers who exited ELS in 2014 due to double-funding issues with Greening requirements for 
CAP Pillar I funding and have not applied for CS;  
ii. Farmers who applied for CS in 2015 (or subsequent years) but were unsuccessful; 
iii. Farmers with an existing ES agreement but offered the opportunity to add additional options 
under CS. 
It would seem that the third group offers the most potential as this represents a large number of 
agreement holders, and is not biased in being disengaged (as group i) or unsuccessful applicants for CS 
(as group ii) where there may be eligibility issues. The main limitation is the extent to which this 
constrains the options which can be tested and/or the extent to which these farms have ‘saturated’ 
their demand for the scheme e.g. all land which is less productive for agriculture has already been 
included in ELS options. Given the substantial population, a suitable sample should be available. 
Sample size and selection for pilots 
The key requirement for piloting reverse auctions as outlined above is a representative sample on a 
scale which can provide robust evidence on the efficiency gains or increased value for money that can 
be secured. While the sample needs to be representative of the relevant population (those participating 
in ES), there are trade-offs in accommodating variation in farm type, farm size etc and the need for a 
larger sample.  We recommend that three groups are captured in the pilots to represent the main 
farming systems and contexts as defined by robust farm types (RFT), namely arable farms (RT1 – 
CEREALS and RT2 - GENERAL CROPPING), lowland livestock farms (RT6 – DAIRY and RT8 - LOWLAND 
GRAZING LIVESTOCK) and upland livestock farms (RT7 - LFA GRAZING LIVESTOCK).  Within this 
framework, a range of options can be accommodated. 
Given the heterogeneity within the farming population – by scale, sector and cost distribution – it may 
be best to consider an overall sample which is treated as a single entity to compare an auction approach 
against fixed prices but can accommodate cross-tabulation analysis by these criteria. For each, a total 
sample of 150 farms15 would provide a confidence interval of +/-8% at the 95% confidence level for each 
‘treatment’ and a sub-sample of 50 farms for each farm type. On the basis that this would be matched 
by a similar sized counterfactual sample (randomly assigned), that would require a total sample of at 
least 300 farms.   
 
                                                          
15
 Based on the Fowey River Improvement Auction (http://cserge.ac.uk/research/current-projects/fowey-river-
improvement-auction) where collusion was not an issue, we suggest that a sample of 150 farmers per group is 
sufficient to ensure farmers felt they were in competition for funding. For a “statistically robust sample” the 
probability of success should be similar in the pilot as it would be in the full-scale scheme and farmers recruited 
into the pilot should be a representative sample of the famers that might participate in the full-scale scheme. 
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Table 14: Sample size and confidence interval 












In recruiting the sample it may be necessary to screen for those that (a) are not interested in taking up 
any additional CS options and (b) those that have no capacity to do so, in order that the number of 
maximum number of positive responses are secured in the counterfactual sample. 
It may be advantageous in the pilot program to explore mechanisms to increase participation. For 
example, this may include the provision of training opportunities to unsuccessful bidders, bonus 
payments for bid lodgement, or feedback on bids that may be useful in bid rounds. If up to two-thirds of 
bidders may be unsuccessful, some additional inducements may be required to generate ongoing levels 
of participation. 
Which CS options to pilot 
Not all Countryside Stewardship options are relevant to the three farm type/context groups set out 
above, although some common options will apply. Ideally, the pilots would focus on a limited number of 
themes, for example to represent the key environmental priorities for CS, namely biodiversity and water 
quality. Some possibilities are set out below on the basis of contexts and theme. 
Table 15: Possible CS options for use in reverse auction field-scale pilots 
 
Theme 




Legume and herb-rich 
swards (GS4) 
Enclosed rough grazing 
(UP1) 
Water quality 
Arable reversion to 
grassland with low 
fertiliser input (SW7) 
Management of intensive 




  Stone wall restoration 
(BN12) 
 
The options are based on a trade-off between options which might be popular or well-funded and will 
attract competition for agreements and options which are not already well-represented in existing ELS 
agreements. For example, SW7 was previously only available in HLS while AB16 and SW8 are new in CS. 
Some types of option may be more suited to an auction approach than others e.g. where continuity at a 
site is not critical and where outputs are tangible. Ultimately, the decision may also be shaped by the 
category of participants targeted. For example, farmers with existing ES agreements could only be 
offered additional options which they do not already have. For evaluation, it might be helpful to trial 
only a limited number of options which all participants are offered and on this basis, options new to 
Countryside Stewardship may be preferable. 
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Timescales for pilots 
A number of discrete steps in the establishment and running of pilots are envisaged as follows: 
1. Agree the design options to be tested and target population 
2. Recruit a statistically robust sample of farmers. 
3. Research the sample (cost distribution, transaction costs, capacity to participate etc.) prior to 
running in the pilot 
4. Develop and trial a platform for operating the auction to ensure functionality and utility 
5. Trial the auction design options. It may also be helpful to run the pilot over successive years to 
test learning. 
6. Report the pilots and make recommendations on their use in agri-environment schemes.  
As such we recommend that a phased approach is taken over a period of 2-3 years to provide robust 
evidence on the economic case for introducing reverse auctions as a delivery mechanism for 
Countryside Stewardship. At each stage if problems are found e.g. failure to secure participation, 
absence of economic efficiency in practice or risks to achieving environmental objectives, there would 
be an opportunity to draw the work to a close. 
Evaluation framework 
To measure the additional VFM from using auctions, it is necessary to compare against the standard CS 
fixed price approach (counterfactual). This presents a challenge as there is a live scheme. Options 
include:  
i. Ask pilot participants to complete an application for the standard CS scheme; 
ii. Where failed CS applicants are recruited, this data would already be available; 
iii. Recruit a larger sample and randomly assign to a fixed price or auction group. 
The main design challenge is what basis to use for measuring the performance of these auctions and 
design variants at a field scale. This counterfactual could be a control group which is asked to bid under 
a fixed price system. Alternatively the pilot farmers could be asked to bid under both mechanisms but 
there is a risk of learning affecting the outcome. We recommend option (iii) above, namely recruiting a 
larger sample and randomly assigning half to a fixed price group and half to an auction group. 
The evaluation should follow accepted evaluation protocols e.g. the Magenta book 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-magenta-book).  Key issues for the reverse auction 
pilots include: 
• Defining and recruiting the participant and counterfactual sample (given the live Countryside 
Stewardship scheme from 2016). 
• Dealing with representativeness and selection bias in the sample (both reverse auction and 
counterfactual groups), allowing for heterogeneity within the population. 
• Timescales for securing the sample, establishing the pilots and undertaking the evaluation. 
• Selection of Countryside Stewardship options to be used in the pilots. 
• Quantifying value for money of reverse auctions relative to a fixed price approach and scaling up 
to a country level. 
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